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PALESTINE



COMMON CONTEXT ANALYSIS (CCA)

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ACRONYMS

BDS: Boycott, Divest and Sanctions
CEPR: Council for European Palestinian Relations
DGD: Directorate General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid
EC: European Commission
GoI: Government of Israel
GPU: General Palestinian Union for NGOs in Gaza
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
HCT: Humanitarian Country Team
HR: Human Rights
ICCG: Inter-cluster coordination group
ILO: International Labour Organization
INGO: International NGO
NCDs: Non-communicable diseases
NGA: Non Government Actor
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PA: Palestinian Authority
PCBS: Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics
PGUS: Palestinian General Union of Charitable Societies
PLC: Palestinian Legislative Council
PNIN: Palestinian National Institute of NGOs
PNGO: Palestinian NGO Network
PwD: People with disability
TVET: Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNMAS: United Nations Mine Action Service
UNWRA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WB: World Bank
WHO: World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY IN DUTCH CCA PALESTINE

De GCA Palestina is het resultaat van een collectief proces van 15 Belgische NGA's: 11.11.11 (lead), AADC, , BD, Caritas, APEFE, ARES-CCD, Caritas International, CNCD, DvW-MdM, G3W-M3M HI,

Oxfam Sol, Oxfam WW, SolSoc, UVCW, VLIR-UOS, en de GCA Waardig werk Noord en West Afrika & Palestina. (zie §1 en 2), alsook de lokale vertegenwoordigers van de betrokken NGA's, hun partnerorganisaties, lokale thematische experten, en vertegenwoordigers van de lokale overheid. Verder werden strategische actoren zoals het Belgisch Consulaat in Oost-Jeruzalem, de EU-delegatie en diverse relevante overheidsinstellingen en INGA's gerelateerd tot de gekozen hoofdthema's geconsulteerd. Het proces bevatte overleg-, informatie- en validatiemomenten in België, 2 werkvergaderingen in Palestina, met een focus op 1. de contextanalyse, en 2. synergie en complementariteit.

De huidige en toekomstige interventies van de betrokken NGA's situeren zich in de volgende 5 thema's: 1. Educatie, 2. Gezondheid, 3. Versterking van de civiele maatschappij en goed bestuur, 4. Landbouw, en 5. Rehabilitatie en Heropbouw. Transversale thema's zoals gender, jongeren, milieu en waardig werk werden in deze thema's ingebed. Een aantal programma's bevatten reeds concrete vormen van synergetische en of complementaire werking tussen de NGA's of met andere internationale of lokale actoren (zie §2). Enkele voorbeelden zijn het Midden-Oosten platform dat door 11.11.11 wordt gecoördineerd, het synergieproject van Caritas, de structurele samenwerking binnen de Oxfam-familie, de goede bilaterale contacten van alle NGA's met DGD en het Belgische Consulaat.

Deze thema's werden gekozen op basis van bestaande analyses van de sociaal-politiek-economische context van het land. Hun relevantie werd bevestigd na contacten met relevante actoren in de ontwikkelingsprocessen van Palestina. Deze analyse wordt uitgebreid beschreven in de hoofdstukken 3 t.e.m. 5. Enkele kernelementen hieruit zijn de volgende:

-Een duurzame en rechtvaardige oplossing voor het Israëliësch-Palestijns conflict is onmogelijk zolang Israëls bezetting en zijn schendingen van het internationaal recht aanhouden.

-Nochtans heeft Palestina heel wat troeven, de bevolking is jong, relatief goed geschoold, er is een dynamisch middenveld, er is potentieel voor de uitbouw van een gediversifieerde economie die handelsrelaties kan uitbouwen in de regio en daarbuiten.

-De bezetting leidde tot een situatie van de-development van Palestina, en donorhulp kan deze situatie niet omkeren. Bij de Palestijnse bevolking is er hoge werkloosheid, een groeiende afhankelijkheid van hulp en een toenemende frustratie.

-De Palestijnse Autoriteit is verantwoordelijk voor de levering van basisdiensten zoals onderwijs en gezondheidszorg, maar de afhankelijkheid van UNRWA, andere VN-instellingen en INGO's blijft uitermate groot. De PA is geen efficiënte regering, door het gebrek aan soevereiniteit, de Israëliëse restricties en de interne Palestijnse verdeeldheid.

-Israëls bezettingspolitiek, het afscheidingsbeleid en de vernieling van infrastructuur ondermijnden het project voor de Palestijnse staatsopbouw en verhinderen de uitbouw van een kwalitatieve dienstverlening.

-Deze context maakt ook dat kwetsbare groepen, zoals vrouwen, jongeren en mensen met een handicap het moeilijk hebben om hun plaats in de maatschappij op te eisen. Het is voor jongeren een uitdaging om zich te engageren voor projecten die hen op korte termijn een betere toekomst kan garanderen. Ook de patriarchale structuur en het toenemende conservatisme in de Palestijnse maatschappij verhinderen de emancipatie van kwetsbare groepen.

-Twintig jaar na de Oslo-vredesakkoorden lijkt de twee-statenoplossing onmogelijk te worden. De EU en de VS blijven aarzelend om de druk op Israël te verhogen en slaagt er niet in een meer coherent beleid uit te dat gebaseerd is op het respect voor het internationaal recht.

-De falende vredesgesprekken en het gebrek aan perspectief zette de Palestijnse leiders ertoe aan om het lidmaatschap bij internationale instellingen aan te vragen. Het lidmaatschap van het Internationaal Strafhof is een belangrijke verwezenlijking die de focus legt op het belang van rekenschap en

het einde van de straffeloosheid voor schendingen van het internationaal recht, zowel door Israël als door de Palestijnse gewapende groeperingen.

-De aanhoudende vete tussen Fatah en Hamas en de machtsovername van Hamas in Gaza in 2007, bemoeilijken de uitbouw van een goed bestuur nog verder en verdelen de Palestijnse maatschappij. Het wordt ook voor ngo's en vakbonden moeilijker om zelfstandig te opereren.

-De perspectieven voor economische ontwikkeling zijn gering en daarom neemt landbouw een belangrijke plaats in. De landbouwsector wordt echter bijzonder hard getroffen door de bezetting en de restricties van Israël: de oneerlijke verdeling van het beschikbare zoetwater, de confiscatie van landbouwgrond en bronnen, de bouw van de Muur, de bufferzone in Gaza, enz. Dit heeft geleid tot een drastische terugval van de landbouwproductie, en een steeds toenemende afhankelijkheid van de steun van de internationale en nationale ngo's.

-De schoolomgeving kampt met diverse vormen van geweld, waaronder psychologisch en bezetting gerelateerd geweld. Bovendien, leiden gewapende conflicten en vijandelijkheden tot directe aanvallen op scholen, waarbij studenten en docenten gedood of verwond worden, en scholen beschadigd worden. De onderwijssector kent talrijke uitdagingen: het tekort aan gekwalificeerde leraren, een gebrekkige schoolinfrastructuur, een chronisch tekort aan klaslokalen, zeker in Gaza, beperkingen op de bouw, uitbreiding en herstellen van scholen. Deze factoren leiden tot een stijging van het aantal schoolverlaters, zwakkere leerprestaties en, in sommige gevallen, gedwongen verplaatsing.

-Hetzelfde geldt ongeveer voor de zorgsector, ondanks inspanningen van het Ministerie voor Gezondheidszorg om de dienstverlening te verbeteren blijven de uitdagingen enorm, inzake infrastructuur en human resources. Vooral in Gaza is de situatie precair, de diverse bombardementen en de blokkade zorgen voor een permanente noodsituatie. De permanente dreiging van het opflakkeren van geweld zorgt voor een grote mate aan trauma's en mentale stoornissen. Binnen deze context zijn de mensen met een handicap zowat de meest kwetsbare groep.

- Tot slot werd ook de sector van de humanitaire hulp en heropbouw van het land geanalyseerd. In principe was dit niet nodig, maar de NGA's waren van oordeel dat dit wel degelijk relevant was. Ook hier krijgen we eenzelfde verhaal: de grote afhankelijkheid van Palestina houdt haar zijn positie zwak en kwetsbaar. Structurele oplossingen blijven uit en nu de VN-instantie UNRWA lijdt onder een permanente onder-financiering dreigt de situatie voor de Palestijnen in de vluchtelingenkampen dreigt helemaal ondraaglijk te worden.

Palestina kent een brede waaier aan organisaties in de civiele maatschappij (zie § 4) die heel divers zijn inzake expertise, grootte, ideologie en weerbaarheid. Hoofdstuk 5 verdiept de analyse van zowel de civiele maatschappij als de overheid. Daar worden ook mogelijke concrete interventie-pistes beschreven die inspelen op de prangende thematieken rond het versterken van de civiele maatschappij en georganiseerde groepen (boeren, ondernemers, werknemers..). Deze interventies streven naar een meer gelijke en inclusieve civiele maatschappij – en hebben als belangrijkste doel de betrokken organisaties beter te wapenen voor hun kerntaken (bewegingsopbouw, belangenbehartiging, dienstverlening, verdediging van mensenrechten..), met een extra inspanning op het bereken van jongeren en vrouwen (educatie, leiderschapsvorming).

De afhankelijkheid van externe donoren maakt dat alle relevante internationale en regionale ontwikkelingsactoren zoals de VN-organisaties, financiële instellingen, de EU, de VS en, andere internationale donoren, , , belangrijke actoren zijn voor de Palestijnse overheidsinstellingen, universiteiten en onderzoeksinstellingen, etc. In hoofdstuk 6 worden de belangrijkste actoren en hun bestaande of mogelijke rol nader omschreven. Deze en andere mogelijke partners van de betrokken NGA's worden in hoofdstuk 7 aangegeven.

De mogelijke interventies van de betrokken NGA's situeren zich op het niveau van integrale ontwikke-

ling (focus op mens en gemeenschap), de ondersteuning van actief burgerschap met versterkte en inclusieve civiele organisaties op alle niveaus (lokaal, nationaal, regionaal, internationaal) die hun belangen verdedigen en hun rechten afdwingen. In hoofdstuk 8 worden de mogelijke interventiemodellen vermeld. De algemene strategieën zijn: capaciteitsversterking op organisatorisch en inhoudelijk vlak om een betere dienstverlening te verzekeren, het mee promoten van een rechtenbenadering voor de diverse sectoren en het integreren van politiek werk in de acties om de druk op alle mogelijke autoriteiten te verhogen. De sector- en thema-gebonden interventies worden verder uitgewerkt in § 8.2.2 tot en met § 8.2.8.

De analyse van de context en actoren en de geplande interventies werden ook onderworpen aan een analyse van risico's en mogelijke opportuniteiten voor de 7 hoofdthema's (zie § 9). Over de sectoren heen zijn de volgende opportuniteiten te distilleren: Er zijn heel wat degelijke en ervaren CSO's die hun interventies plannen binnen een mensenrechtenbenadering. Er is een grote aanwezigheid van internationale ngo's en solidariteitsgroepen die opkomen voor de rechten van het Palestijnse volk. De jongeren zijn behoorlijk goed opgeleid. Algemene risico's omvatten: het bezettings- en afscheidingsbeleid van Israël, een verdeeld, inefficiënt en weinig integer bestuur, weinig staatssteun voor de familielandbouw en innovatieve economie, een gebrek aan een duurzaam natuurbeleid en het gebrek aan toekomstperspectieven. De grote afhankelijkheid van buitenlandse donoren, maakt dat zowel overheid als CSO's zich vaak moeten inschakelen in de doelstellingen van de belangrijkste geldschietters.

Om de opportuniteiten voor synergie en complementariteit tussen de betrokken en andere relevante actoren te identificeren, werd er een lokaal proces opgezet, met consultaties van verschillende actoren. Hierbij werd onderscheid gemaakt tussen korte, middellange en lange termijn perspectieven, alsook tussen thematische versus operationele en strategische allianties (zie details in §10). De be-

staande synergiën en complementariteit werden in kaart gebracht, en zullen, waar relevant, worden verdergezet. De nieuwe pistes die opborrelden tijdens diverse meetings werden afgewogen, en later, in een collectief overleg van de NGA's, vervolledigd en bekrachtigd. De belangrijkste geïdentificeerde opportuniteiten inzake synergie en complementariteit zijn de volgende:

A/ UITWISSELING VAN INFORMATIE:

- Het platform Midden-Oosten brengt diverse Belgische NGA's en solidariteitsgroepen op regelmatige tijdstippen samen voor overleg en planning van acties;
- Zowel de NGA's als de actoren van de Belgische overheid (DGD, BTC, Belgisch Consulaat in Oost-Jeruzalem) zijn voorstander van een meer geïnstitutionaliseerde overleg voor uitwisseling en mogelijks het identificeren en verkennen van synergiën. Indien relevant, kan het overleg ook worden opgesplitst per sector (bijv. Onderwijs) of thematische (bijv. Jongeren) werkgroepen.
- Eén werkgroep zou alvast alle Belgische actoren inzake 'inclusief onderwijs' kunnen clusteren als een eerste stap naar verdere optimalisatie van de complementariteit en het bespreken van operationele samenwerking (zie hieronder).
- Betere informatie-doorstroming organiseren binnen de NGA's, o.a. voor het bekomen van studiebeurzen;
- Om de relevantie van het academische werk te verhogen kan VLIR-UOS de Belgische en lokale NGA's beter betrekken in het uitwerken van hun landenstrategie;
- De creatie van een Belgisch netwerk van lokale besturen voor Palestina met als doel een betere coördinatie van de gemeentelijke acties;
- Een structureel overleg (vb. jaarlijks) met de Belgische overheid, in bijzonder DGD, BTC en het Belgisch consulaat in Oost-Jeruzalem over hun strategieën in de regio;
- Jongeren als doelgroep: overleg over de diverse strategieën om jongeren beter te betrekken bij lokale besluitvorming en de kinderrechten te promoten en laten respecteren.

-Broederlijk Delen deelt informatie over de situatie van mensenrechtenverdedigers in Palestina en Israël en faciliteert gemeenschappelijk beleidswerk van de NGA's in België en de EU.

B/ OPERATIONEEL:

- De synergie en complementariteit situeert zich in dezelfde thematische domeinen, maar richt zich op het maximaliseren van bestaande allianties van Belgische NGA's met lokale en internationale actoren, ten voordele van de bediende doelgroepen.
- Inclusief onderwijs: AADC, HI, APEFE en de provincie Henegouwen gaan voor een beter geïntegreerde aanpak van inclusief onderwijs. Zij stellen tot doel om de coördinatie inzake capaciteitsopbouw van de betrokkenen te verbeteren, het optimaliseren van hun geografische complementariteit en het linken met andere sectoren, zoals gezondheidszorg en economische ontwikkeling. Indien dit slaagt kunnen middelen (apparatuur, deskundigen ...) worden gedeeld.
 - Gezondheid en revalidatiezorg: AADC, HI, APEFE en de provincie Henegouwen zullen een gelijkaardig proces verkennen, zoals voor inclusief onderwijs, met het doel om de samenhang en de efficiëntie te verbeteren.
 - Het huidige synergie project van Caritas Int brengt alle lokale stakeholders samen onder een uniek platform met het oog op lokale economische ontwikkeling. Dankzij het LGRDP programma van BTC is het voor NGA's mogelijk om programma's medegefinancierd te krijgen in het kader van versterking van lokale besturen in landelijke regio's.
 - Op dit moment vallen de Palestijnse media buiten het gezichtsveld van de meeste NGA's, nochtans zijn het belangrijke spelers die mee kunnen helpen aan het verspreiden van de boodschappen van de lokale CSOs. De provincie van Henegouwen werkt reeds samen met Ma'an, en wil deze expertise delen met andere NGA's.
 - De uitwisseling tussen de academische wereld en de CSO's kan leiden tot meer concrete samenwerking, zoals stages en veldonderzoek;
 - G3W-M3M en PHM: de samenwerking om de Palestijnse afdeling van People's Health Movement

te versterken wordt verder gezet;

- Broederlijk Delen faciliteert gemeenschappelijk werk van Palestijnse en Israëliische organisaties over het respect voor het internationaal recht; via beleidsbeïnvloeding in België, de EU en Israël en via sensibilisering in België.

C/ INSTITUTIONEEL:

-Oxfam-Sol heeft haar programma uitgewerkt samen met 4 andere Oxfam-leden, en bouwt binnen dit consortium haar eigen expertise uit. Oxfam is ook lid van AIDA en neemt de leiding van sommige van de VN sector clusters.

-Vanaf 2015 werken G3W-M3M, KIYO en Solidagro als een consortium, waarbinnen het recht op gezondheid, voedsel en de kinderrechten zullen worden geïntegreerd.

-Vanaf maart 2014 werkt HI samen met UNRWA om het bewustzijn van het UNRWA-personeel inzake de rechten van mensen met een handicap te verhogen en het werk van het Agentschap in de kanten te steunen. In 2015 werkt HI ook samen met UNMAS om sneller werk te maken van het puinruimen in Gaza. HI is eveneens lid van AIDA en is actief binnen een aantal VN sector clusters.

De debatten om tot een voorstel tot synergie en complementariteit te komen, waren levendig. Er werd vertrokken vanuit de programma's op het terrein, en de institutionele strategische keuzes van de Belgische actoren. De grote verscheidenheid aan synergie en complementariteit heeft een direct verband met de uiteenlopende actieterreinen en strategieën van de NGA's. We kunnen concluderen dat er sprake is van een vrij grote complementariteit tussen hen. De opsomming aan potentiële synergiën tonen aan dat de bereidheid om beter samen te werken, zeker aanwezig is. Nu net de beslissing is gevallen dat 11.11.11 het Midden-Oosten platform sterker wil ondersteunen met het aanwerven van een halftijdse kracht, kan dit de samenwerking tussen de NGA's en hun partners versterken en nieuwe pistes opleveren voor beleidswerk, zowel in Palestina, Israël, als in België en op Europees vlak. Want de slotconclusie van

deze GCA is dat alle hulp aan Palestina fragiel blijft zolang de wortels van het conflict niet aangepakt worden. Daarom investeren de NGA's veel energie in gemeenschappelijk politiek werk en campagnes. Ze ijveren voor een meer coherent Belgisch en Europees beleid dat gestoeld is op het respect voor het internationaal recht.

INTRODUCTION

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

This Common Context Analysis (CCA) of Palestine presented here, is a result of the Law on Belgian Development Cooperation (03/19/2013 amended by Act 01/09/2014) art 2- 6 °/ 7 and the Royal Decree of April 24, 2014 Article 14 §1 & 2.

The objective is to make a qualitative analysis by NGAs (Non Governmental Actors) within the context of Palestine, accordingly to the format which was presented in the Royal Decree. It is therefore a presentation of the context and the opportunities for synergy and complementarity, and not a paper with concrete programs, projects or other specific targets.

This context analysis cannot be used as a source of information to attribute certain positions to any specific organization or partner organization mentioned in this document. This context analysis is in the first place an opportunity to identify areas of cooperation, synergies and complementarities. If approved, this CCA-Palestine will be an important reference document for:

- The programs that will be submitted to DGD, in which for every specific objective will have to be indicated in which way the program takes into account at least one CCA.

- The expected progress report in 2019 about the implementation of the CCA which were identified in this paper related to the opportunities for to complementarity and synergy.
- The allocation of DGD-funds related to synergy initiatives.

WHAT TO EXPECT IN THIS CCA

This analysis will only focus on Palestine, but some NGAs also support Israel based CSOs, in order to contribute to the respect for international law, the basic rights of Palestinians and to stimulate dialog. It is assumed that, in order to achieve a sustainable solution for this protracted conflict, it is imperial to involve Israeli organizations. Throughout the document, we have opted to use 'Palestine' as the country name, in line with the UNGA resolution in 2012, and when we mention 'West Bank', it includes East Jerusalem.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

In this exercise participated all non-governmental actors (NGAs) that possibly will have a program in Palestine the next 10 years. It concerns the following 14 participants and their coordinates (including the lead):

	ANGS	ADDRESS	CONTACT
1	11.11.11	Vlasfabriekstraat 11, 1060 Brussels	Kris Vanslambrouck
2	APEFE	2, Place Saintelette, 1080 Brussels	Sigrid De Meester
3	Broederlijk Delen (BD)	Huidevetterstraat 165, 1000 Brussels	Brigitte Herremans Marleen Willemsen
4	Caritas International (Carint)	43, rue de la Charité, 1210 Brussels	Bernadette van Raemdonck & GeatanDe- visme

5	Handicap International	Rue de l'Arbre Bénit 44 bte 1, 1050 Bruxelles	Candida Salgadosilva
6	AADC (Association pour l'Action de Développement Communautaire)	Place Albert 1er, 34, 031 Monceau-sur-Sambre	Ariane de Saeger
7	CCA Decent Work	Coenraetstraat 68, 1060 Bruxelles	Véronique Wémaere
8	VLIR-UOS	Bolwerksquare 1 , 1050 Brussels	Koen De Koster
9	Solidarité Socialiste (SolSoc)	Coenraetstraat 68, 1060 Bruxelles	François Sarramagnan
10	UVCW/AVCB (Union des Villes et Communes de Wallonie)	Rue de l'Etoile 14, 5 000 Namur	Hicham Boumezzough
11	Oxfam Solidariteit – Solidarité (OxfamSol)	Vierwindenstraat 60, 1080 Brussels	Laurent Bourgeois
12	G3W –M3M	Haachtsesteenweg 53, 1120 Brussels	Anuschka Mahieu
13	Oxfam WW	Ververijstraat 17, 9000 Gent	Floor Michielsen
14	Médecins du Monde/Dokters van de Wereld	Rue Botanique 67- 75, 1210 Brussels	Stephane Heymans

THE MEMBERS OF THE CCA ON DECENT WORK WEST AND NORTH AFRICA AND PALESTINE ARE:

Solidarité Socialiste	Rue Coenraets, 68, 1060 Bruxelles	Véronique Wemaer (lead)
WSM	Haachtsesteenweg 579, 1030 Brussel	Fabien Habimana
FOS	Grasmarkt 105 bus 46, 1000 Brussel	Kwaku Acheampong
ABVV /FGTB	42, rue Haute, 1000 Bruxelles	Laurent ATSOU
ACV/CSC	Chaussee De Haecht 579, 1030 Bruxelles	Karin Debroey
ACLVB/CGSLB	Boulevard Baudouin 8, 1000 Bruxelles	Maresa Le Roux,

DISCLAIMER

The text of the CCA is meant to reflect the exchanges among organizations about their point of view from a technical and operational perspective, to reflect the most common perspectives. In case a specific analysis or position is not shared with all the members, the specific organization(s) will be explicitly referred to.

1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CCA-PROCESS, THE PARTICIPATION OF THE NGAS, THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE LOCAL PARTNERS AND EVENTUALLY OTHER PARTICIPATING PARTNERS

1.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CCA-PROCESS

DATE	ACTIVITY	PROGRESS
January 29 - Brussels	Lead participates at Info-session on CCA	The CCA-process is better understood and better idea of the timing
February 5 Brussels	Official launching of the CCA-Palestine working group	Final list of NGA-participants
March 15 – Brussels	First meeting of CCA-members	Consensus on themes and methodology
March 26	Lead participates at info-session with other leads	Opportunity for peer to peer exchange and updates
April 22 –Brussels	Table of Content	Clear division of tasks: who will provide input
May 6 –Brussels	Meeting with DEG (Ms Donnay), together with BD and SolSoc.	Update about CCA-process and preparation of Belgian Forum in Ramallah
May 13 - Brussels	Bilateral meeting with APEFE	Presentation of APEFE-program and local partners
May 18 - Brussels	Bilateral meeting with Oxfam Sol	Presentation of Oxfam-program and local partners
May 25-29	Mission to Palestine with DGD, participation at Belgian Forum and visits to local partners	Updating stakeholders about the CCA-process and program of the CCA-members
May 29	Bilateral meeting with Handicap International	Presentation of HI program and update on the CCA process
June 30	CCA Palestine working group	Initial comments on the process and

		planning of the continued CCA-process
September 9	CCA Palestine working group	Discuss and identify potential areas for synergy work
September 11	Working group synergy in the education and health sector	Deepening the synergy options for both sectors

This document was drafted by 11.11.11 (as lead organization in this common effort) and is a result of the extensive inputs by the involved NGAs. The CCA-Vademecum presented by 11.11.11 and CNCD served as a reference for the content table of this CCA. The analysis on different issues found below were provided by the NGAs on several occasions. The drafts have been shared, commented, revised at meetings in Brussels and Palestine. Local experts and partners have provided information for the draft CCA and were invited to give their feedback and help identify synergies and complementarities. More details of the CCA-process can be found in the table on top, this table only includes the official meetings between NGAs, but most of the work and exchange took place in e-mail exchanges and online editing and commenting of the draft CCA.

Decent work is one of the three priority themes. As a result, the CCA Decent Work North & West Africa and Palestine provided input for chapter 3 of this CCA on the social situation in Palestine. For the complete context analysis related to this topic we kindly refer to the thematic regional CCA Decent Work. Furthermore, in the course of the process, possibilities of complementarity and synergy with regards to Decent Work were investigated. They are discussed in chapter 10. In that sense, the CCA Palestine and the thematic CCA Decent Work are, thus, complementary and need to be read at the same time. Together they form one complete analysis on Palestine.

This thematic CCA is based on reports and the analysis of Palestinian, Israeli and international actors that have a proven expertise in the country.

To the extent possible, partners were actively involved in elaborating this thematic CCA. During the process, one representative of the NGAs participating in the CCA Decent Work North & West Africa and Palestine was contact person for this country - CCA to ensure the link and the complementarity between the thematic CCA and the country – CCA. The thematic CCA covers the four strategic pillars of the ILO Decent Work Agenda extensively.

Social enterprising, access to health and education, defending human rights are important areas of intervention when striving for the implementation of the Decent Work Agenda. The same areas of intervention are being tackled in this CCA. Therefore, the description and identification of these areas of intervention, as described in chapter 3 and 8, have to be understood from the point of view of this country CCA as well as that from the thematic CCA Decent Work N&W Africa and Palestine, as both are complementary.

1.2 PARTICIPATION OF THE NGA'S

The CCA is a joint effort of the organizations mentioned above. A list of themes was selected for this CCA-document. However, given the very limited presence in Palestine, it was decided not to set up thematic working groups, but to focus on a collective exercise, where each NGA can contribute according to its expertise.

1.3 INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL PARTNERS (AND LOCAL OFFICES)

The CCA-process was one of the first topics which was discussed among the CCA-members. We agreed to split up the process in two phases. In the first phase, the NGAs had to collect their in hand information and analysis, which were already a result of previous consultation processes with the partners, check whether updates were necessary, and forward this to the lead-NGA. This period started in February and ran more or less till the first draft of the CCA, mid June. In this phase, each NGA had the opportunity to consult with its partners and the few local NGA-offices. The reference list reveals that the descriptions and analysis are based on relevant inputs from the South or centers of expertise.

The second phase started with the presentation of the first draft, which was commented by the NGAs and provided more insights to discuss and identify the potential synergies between the NGAs. The result can be read in Chapter 10.

1.4 THE INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER LOCAL ACTORS (BELGIAN GOVERNMENT, INGOS, EU)

Palestine is an official partner country of the Belgian Development Agency. The Belgian Consulate in Jerusalem has played an active role in bringing

together the Palestinian partners of the Belgian NGAs in order to exchange information and update them about the CCA-process. Some NGAs have joined the Belgian NGA Forum in May, organized by the Consulate. This was a key opportunity for exchange and discussion on the programs of Belgian actors that are active in the country.

The EU has drafted an excellent Country Roadmap for Engagement with civil society, in which it confirms its commitment to provide continued support to CSOs along 4 priority interventions: enhance the internal governance of CSOs, strengthen the financial stability, strengthen the participation of CSOs in policy formulation and monitoring of public policies and services, and, support an active networking and interaction between local NGOs in West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. In a meeting with the Political Section of the EU Delegation, the EU-representative expressed his satisfaction over the fact that the Belgian NGAs were aware of the Roadmap, and were using it as a source of information along the CCA-process.

Most NGAs have contacts with INGOS, and some of them are INGOS, like HI and Oxfam, with a local representation, unlike the 'Belgian' NGAs. Most Belgian NGOs and Belgian branches of INGOS are member of the Belgian Middle East platform, hosted by 11.11.11.

[Annex1 : Bibliography of existing analysis of NGAs, local partners and international actors](#)

[Annex2 : List of local actors involved](#)

2 MAPPING OF PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, SYNERGY-PROJECTS AND PARTNERSHIPS THAT WERE IMPLEMENTED BY THE NGAS DURING THE LAST 5 YEARS IN PALESTINE

2.1 TABLE WITH PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

APEFE	Program to improve nursing care in the regions of Bethlehem and Hebron	2011-2013 2014-2016
	Program to allow access of vulnerable groups to community services	2011-2013 2014-2016
Handicap International	Improving access of children with disabilities to quality multi-disciplinary rehabilitation services in the Gaza Strip	2011-2015
	Strengthening the disability movement for the rights and equal opportunities of persons with disabilities in the Gaza Strip	2012-2015
	Access to physical rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities in the West Bank	2010-2013
	Advancing the rights of vulnerable and marginalized persons with disabilities in the West Bank through all inclusive advocacy led by the disability movement	2012-2015
	Multi-stakeholder initiative towards a more effective response to Persons with Disabilities' needs and demands in the State of Palestine	2014-2017
	Improved Access to Services for Persons with Disabilities in the West Bank and Gaza (inclusive education and rehabilitation)	2014-2016
	Emergency intervention for the most vulnerable women, men, children affected by the Gaza crisis (rehabilitation)	2014
	Post-emergency and early recovery intervention to improve access to essentials services in the Gaza Strip for most vulnerable individuals and families (reconstruction and livelihoods)	2015-2016
	Explosive Remnants of War threat reduction in support to rubble removal and reconstruction in Gaza, Palestine (risk education)	2014-2015

Solidarité Socialiste	“Hand in hand”, promoting financial access to education for Birzeit University students (WBI)	2014-2015
	Capacity building of youth for the creation of a social movement that supports equality, freedom, human rights and social, political and economic justice (DGD)	2014-2016
Caritas	Synergy project in Jenin Governorate (Local Economic Development with 2 municipalities)	
	Emergency Appeal for Gaza 2014 with the Caritas Network (own funds)	
UVCW - AVCB/VSGB*	<p>Twining Ixelles Zababdeh : “Discover each other through water”(EU Project –Developmental education) “More Water for Palestinian People”(WBI - Improving water supply and Capacity building in collaboration with P.A.R.C.) “A green Project”(WBI - Irrigation Water Distribution Network for Farmers of Zababdeh in collaboration with P.A.R.C.) “Millennium Youth Project”(EU project –Developmental education and youth exchange) Twining Tournai Bethlehem: “Capacity building of disabled people through media” Cooperation agreement between the province of Hainaut and the governorate of Bethlehem: “Media coverage and promotion of the rights of disabled people by the Bethlehem Governorate via the Palestine News Network (PNN) and through the joint creation and formative joint dissemination of radio and television broadcasts.” Twining Liege –Ramallah: 3 priority axes: Culture, education and sustainable development</p>	2010 - 2015
Oxfam Sol	Increased access to health care and protection of vulnerable groups in Southern West Bank	2013-2014
	Rehabilitation and improved access to agricultural assets in view of strengthening the food security and livelihoods in the Gaza Strip and Southern West Bank	2013-2015
	From emergency actions to development : Towards greater food security for vulnerable populations living in Area C of Southern West Bank	2014-2015
	Improve the quality of emergency health services and preparedness in Gaza	2013-2015
	Support to emergency health care providers during Operation protective hedge	2014
	From emergency food security to durable livelihoods: Building	2016-2017

	resilience in the OPT	
	Integrated protection in Area C: Enhancing the resilience of communities to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law	2016
Broederlijk Delen	Defending rights in Israel and Palestine (program with 4 DGD partners and 7 partners in own funds)	2011-2013
	Access to rights and peace education in Israel-Palestine (program with 7 DGD partners and 1 partner in own funds)	2014-2016
	Drama and dreams - New opportunities for youth in Gaza through theater (with BD partner TDP and Zuiddag-work for change)	2014-2018
VLIR-UOS	Efficient learning through digital information resources in health sciences (ELDIR-med) a project of ICT use in health education and research	2010-2015
	Stimulating film and media in Palestine. The enhancement of the media studies bachelor and the development of a film making minor at the Media Department of the Al Quds University	2011-2013
G3W-M3M	Policy makers and youth in East Jerusalem, Hebron and Bethlehem are mobilized for the right to health (DGD)	2011-2013
	Youth in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza play an active role in the Palestinian social movement to promote the right to health (DGD)	2014-2016

*UVCW - AVCB/VSGB: A dozen of municipalities in Belgium directly support NGO-projects in Palestine without having a twinning with the local LGU. Most of them are linking this with advocacy and awareness raising through cultural events or exchange programs.

2.2 SYNERGY PROJECTS

The main platform to discuss and coordinate advocacy work on Palestine is the Belgian Middle East platform. It gathers those organizations that have a South program and/or who are doing advocacy work on Palestine and it also includes solidarity groups. Advocacy is a key issue for half of the member NGAs of this CCA, as well as for their partners in Palestine and also for the NGAs who are member of the regional Decent Work CCA

which also covers Palestine. This platform also serves as a venue to exchange information on activities with partners, new strategic choices, advocacy tours, etc.

In an increasingly internationalized context, complementarities and synergies, e.g. in terms of expertise, capacity, information sharing or geographical intervention areas, are actively pursued between the Belgian NGAs and the members of various International NGOs (INGOs) in Palestine,

where numerous clusters and working groups are established to coordinate their interventions at specific levels and areas of work. Oxfam Sol and Oxfam WW are part of the Oxfam federation which is developing a common program for Palestine. All of its (humanitarian) intervention are also included in the Humanitarian Program Cycle (HPC), formerly the CAP. Oxfam participates in a wide variety of bodies related to the UN Cluster system: Food Security Sector (FSS) cluster and Food Security Sector Analysis Unit, co-chair of the Livestock Working Group within the FSS. Additionally, Oxfam is active in the Protection and WASH clusters, is a member of the Steering Committee of the Emergency WASH coalition and funds and hosts the EWASH Advocacy Task Force. Additionally, Oxfam is a chair of the European Union-ECHO partners Group, which developed an harmonized approach on Cash Programming, and was also involved in Clusters consultations on developing Strategic Response Plans (SRP) for the 2015 OCHA global SRP. Specifically regarding protection activities in the WB, Oxfam extensively coordinates with the ECHO West Bank Consortium. Also Caritas Belgium is running and or discussing joint-projects with INGOs to pool funds and develop programs within the same sector and or region.

In Palestine, Oxfam is member of the Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA) and of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and is one of the more active agencies within the AIDA Advocacy Working Group and the HCT Advocacy Working Group. Oxfam also participates in the Bedouin task force and attends ad hoc meetings of the Civil Society Advocacy Working Group on Displacement. HI is represented in several coordination mechanisms and bodies in Palestine. It is an active member of the AIDA, a leading member of the International Disability Group (IDG), and is actively involved in several UN system clusters (protection, health, education, shelter) and working groups (psychosocial, child protection, mine action...).

Broederlijk Delen, its partner Theater Day Productions (Gaza) and Zuiddag – work for change (BE)

carry out a synergy project. The objective of this program is to (1) give Gazan youth the opportunity to process things that happened in their lives and experience space to relax. Then, (2) to work on the development of skills and participation, so that youth can finally come to (3) the establishment of their own project or work. (4) the 2-way exchange with Belgian youth in 2014 aimed to obtain mutual learning, inspire each other and create new ideas together and strengthen solidarity.

Synergy with G3W-M3M and People's Health Movement (PHM) Palestine. PHM is a global network bringing together grassroots health activists, CSOs and academic institutions from around the world. PHM currently has a presence in around 70 countries, among which Palestine. The PHM section in Palestine include actors such as Health Work Committees (HWCs), the Union of HWCs, Palestinian Medical Relief Society, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, academia from Palestinian universities. The objectives are to share experience and best practices amongst the different health actors and social movements, support and enhance capacity-building in empowerment processes and movement-building, advocate on a local, regional and international level (such as the Health for All Campaign). G3W-M3M and MPLP are developing synergy projects with HWC in Battir, West Bank and with UHWC in Beit Hanoun, Gaza. The projects are 'twinning projects' between Palestinian and Belgian medical centers. The objectives of these projects are exchange and mutual learning, solidarity, awareness raising in Belgium, financial support.

2.3 PARTNERSHIPS IN COLLABORATION WITH GOVERNMENTS

The new guidelines of Local Government Reform and Development Programme (LGRDP2) demonstrate a willingness from BTC-CTB, to include the Civil Society in Local Governance, in their 4 priority

clusters, and in regions where Belgian NGAs are active. Caritas started a negotiation process with BTC-CTB and MDLF (Municipal Development Lending Fund) in order to share information about LED (Local Economic Development). This led to the synergy project with Caritas in Jenin Governorate, with the objective to support sustainable local development by promoting and facilitating participative dialog between local government units, civil society, community organizations and private sector. The added value of the project is to create a unique platform with all relevant development actors in the region with the aim to generate higher incomes and improve the quality of the government services. In addition, to coordinate with other NGO's and institutions in the area in order to avoid duplication to achieve efficient and effective use of resources. Moreover, to coordinate with all local development players, the consulate of Belgium in Jerusalem, the BTC, the related ministries, to share the information and make the needed resources available to achieve socio-economic development.

2.4 LINKS WITH CCAS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

The thematic CCA Decent Work North & West Africa and Palestine also refers to the Middle East working group, as some of the Decent Work NGAs are also a member of the Middle East Working Group. The members of this group are: Solidarité Socialiste, represented by Véronique Wemaere (lead), WSM (Fabien Habimana), IFSI-ISVI (Laurent Atsou), IEI-IIAV (Karin Debroey) BIS/MSI (Maresa Le Roux, FOS (Kwaku Acheampong) Oxfam Sol (Thierry Kesteloot).

2.5 ASSESSMENT OF DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY RELATED TO SYNERGY

2.5.1 RELATED TO CONTEXT

There are several factors that complicate the structural collaboration between local CSOs and international (including Belgian) NGOs. The Israeli occupation, the political and geographical division between the West Bank and Gaza, the tendency of authorities in both Palestine and Israel to control/limit CSO activities, the extremely limited access to Gaza and the restrictive measures imposed on Palestinians considerably restrict the work and the operational capacity of both Palestinian and Israeli NGOs.

The EU Roadmap also mentions that there is a wide gap between local CSOs and foreign and international NGAs. The latter have greater access to international funding, are able to offer higher wages and have the tendency to impose agendas rather than develop strategic partnerships. Furthermore there is limited coordination among both groups. This general observation might not refer to the Belgian NGAs, as they tend to build long term partnerships with a limited number of local CSOs. However, one area of concern is the limited presence in the field, mainly due to the difficulties to obtain Israeli registration and work permits, and public or private smear campaigns orchestrated by organizations that are believed to be linked to the Israeli government, such as the "NGO-Monitor" or the Israeli Law Center (ShuratHaDin). At this moment, only Oxfam and HI have an international representation in Palestine.

The majority of the Palestinian CSOs also apply a no-collaboration policy with Israeli CSOs who don't explicitly recognize the basic rights of the Palestinian people and denounce the occupation. There is a near consensus within Palestinian civil society that 'normalization' contributes to whitewashing Israel's violations of international law. This position affects cooperation projects between Palestinian and Israeli organizations.

2.5.2 COMMON ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Despite the challenges mentioned above, the NGAs are committed to make efforts in identifying and developing synergies and complementarities.

There are common concerns, shared strategies and similar target groups, such as empowering women and or youth. There seems to be a consensus that both target groups are playing a strategic role in the future development of the nation.

3 ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION IN THE PALESTINE

SOCIAL	2000	2014	SOURCE
Total Population	3 million	4.5 million	PCBS
Population growth (%)	3.08%	2.94%	PCBS
Unemployment rate	12,4%	26.5%	PCBS
Population density West Bank/Gaza		468 – 4505 p/km ²	PCBS (2012)
Literacy % (15+)	84,7%	96,3%	PCBS
GINI coefficient (0-100)		35.5 (2013)	UNDP
Poverty rate at national poverty lines		25,8 (2011)	PCBS
HDI (rank)	108/186 (2005)	107/187	UNDP
HIV cases (West Bank)	33 (2010)		IJID
Life Expectancy at birth	72,3 (2005)	75	
Gender Inequality Index (rank)		110/186 2012)	UNDP

The population numbers mentioned above are the Palestinian people living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, the PCBS estimated that the number of Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, amounted to 6.08 million people in 2014. Palestine has one of the fastest growing populations in the world, with numbers surging 30% over the past decade, and more than half the population below 18 years. Besides, according to UNRWA registers, 5 million Palestine refugees are living abroad. The Palestinian exodus was mostly

caused by the 1948-49 war, which erupted one day after the Israeli declaration of independence, and the Six Day War in 1967. Nearly 1 million Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homeland. The majority is now based in refugee camps Jordan, Lebanon and in Syria. Moreover, the over-population of Gaza dates back to 1948 when approximately 200,000 refugees fled to Gaza from areas which came under Israel's control, the population at that time was only 80.000.

3.1 ANALYSES OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION

POLITICAL	2000	2014	SOURCE
Freedom House Political Rights (0-10, lower = more liberties)	6/10 (2002)	6 (West Bank) 7 (Gaza)	Freedom House
Freedom House Civil Liberties (0-10, lower = more liberties)	5/10 (2002)	5 (West Bank) 6 (Gaza)	Freedom House
Corruption Perceptions Index (rank)	107/159 (2005)	Not mentioned	TI
Economy			
GDP (billions USD)	\$4.32	\$12.7	WB
GDP per capita	\$1.477	\$2,966	WB
Inflation (%)	5%	1.7 %	WB
FDI (million USD)	\$ 19	\$ 113 (2013)	WB
Net ODA received (billion USD)	\$ 1.7	\$ 2.6 (2013)	WB

The Palestinian context is characterized by the constant threat and occupation by Israel, and by internal divisions. The Oslo accords of 1993 were premised on 'land for peace'. Yet, Israel has not withdrawn from the occupied territories. On the contrary it has entrenched its control through the settlements and their supporting infrastructure, checkpoints, the permit system, military zones and the Wall. This is in a great part due to the virtual impunity Israel has enjoyed from the international community for the countless violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (HRL) it has committed.

The Oslo II Accord (1995) has divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions: the areas A, B and C. The distinct areas were given a differ-

ent status, according to the amount of self-government that Palestinians would exercise through the Palestinian Authority, until a final status accord would be established. Area A is in full control of the PA, even though Israeli military regularly performs incursions in this area. Area A is limited to 18% of the West Bank. Area B is under Palestinian civil control and Palestinian security control and amounts to 21% of the area, while Area C is under full Israeli civil and security control and amounts to 61%. Israel considers that it has sovereignty in Area C, where over 200 settlements are located. Some members of the Knesset and the present government even favor full annexation. The Israeli government refuses to grant Palestinians construction permits (effectively rejecting 94% of application in recent years), which has led to the

increased destruction of Palestinian private property. (B'tselem 2013)

Looking at the day-to-day situation of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the West Bank remains extremely worrying. The Israeli military occupation, which started after the 1967 war, results in numerous human rights violations and is the main impediment to Palestinian development. In January 2015, the Israeli Interior Ministry gave figures of 590,000 settlers living in the West Bank. Benefiting of near total impunity, some of the settlers, particularly in the North of the West Bank, are growing increasingly violent toward Palestinians, resulting in destruction of property, psychological and physical trauma, and even death. The road network reserved for settlers continues to expand, which contributes to the fragmentation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Arbitrary arrests, night raids, lawless killings and expulsions and the destruction of homes are a common occurrence. The separation barrier is still ongoing and the annexation of agricultural land and groundwater expands inexorably.

The situation in Gaza is even more critical because of the closures, and later the blockade, imposed by Israel after Hamas took power in 2006. Gaza has the highest population density in the world with 4000 inhabitants per km². The majority of its people depend on international aid. Since Hamas took power, it has gradually reorganized Gaza society in order to entrench its authority and its conservative vision. Social and educational infrastructure has been seized, several schools have been closed arbitrarily, some civil liberties have been undermined, particularly those of women, as has press freedom, and the dissidents and political opponents have been muzzled and even persecuted by the regime. Nowadays, Hamas may find itself facing growing internal challenges – Salafi-jihadi attacks, a collapse of government services, popular protests – from which war appears to be an exit that offers a chance to consolidate power, reestablish military credentials and perhaps relax the closure by reaching a new ceasefire agreement with Israel. (ICG, 2015)

The internal political situation is a growing cause of concern. After the Hamas election victory in 2006, the tensions between Hamas and Fatah have increased, leading to internal strife. After the Hamas coup in Gaza in 2007, two lines of governments have emerged: one directed by President Abbas in the West Bank, and the other directed by Hamas, the de facto authority bin Gaza. Mainly under pressure from internal public opinion, the two parties have attempted several times to form a national unity government. The reconciliation agreement of April 2014 was the latest attempt that has resulted in the government of national consensus, a technocratic government. President Abbas has reshuffled it in July 2015, due to ongoing disputes about the payment of the civil servants. The chances of a genuine reconciliation are very low, as neither party esteems that this would be in its interest. Israel vehemently opposes reconciliation. Indeed, for many in Israel, a reversal of its policy of separating Gaza from the West Bank is viewed as a serious security threat, as Gaza's separation is thought to prevent Hamas from transferring knowledge, weapons, funding and political influence to the West Bank, where its increased power would come at the expense of Israel's security partner, the Fatah-dominated PA. To significant parts of the governing coalition, furthering the separation of the territories also serves demographic interests, as Israel has not relinquished its claim to the West Bank. In the meantime, the Palestinian Legal Council no longer functions, and the West Bank is governed since 2006 by Presidential Decree.

In order to overcome the stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process, President Abbas undertook a series of diplomatic efforts to obtain recognition of the state of Palestine by the UN. In October 2011, UNESCO has granted Palestine the status of a member state, resulting in the USA halting funding of the organization. The request for recognition by the UN Security Council has not succeeded, largely because of the opposition from the USA. Consequently in November 2012, the UN GA has upgraded the status of Palestine as a non-member observer State. In retaliation, the Israeli government

has approved the construction of 3500 new houses on the West Bank and suspended the transfer of taxes collected on behalf of Palestine. Since then, the transfer of taxes and customs duties has been re-established, but the Israeli government is intent on continuing the settlement expansion thus preventing the realization of the two-state solution. Observers believe that the window of the two state solution is rapidly closing. (2014, HOM report on East Jerusalem) In December 2014, Palestine has signed the Rome Statute and became a state party to the International Criminal Court Treaty (ICC) on April 1, 2015. It is still unclear what impact this could have, however it opens opportunities for Palestine to demand for an official investigation.

The Palestinian question also has to be seen in the light of the broader situation in the Middle East, where the instability is growing, civilians are increasingly suffering from human rights violations and the influence of radical groups is growing. The rising radicalism has a tremendous impact on society, in particular it negatively affects women's rights and the situation of children and youngsters. Palestinian women have a long tradition of being actively involved in civil society activism and politics. However, there is a lack of recognition and visibility of this participation due to internal patriarchal control. This is especially worrying in the Gaza Strip where Hamas has been reversing women's rights. Furthermore, the Israeli occupation also negatively impacts the political, legal, economic and educational status of women. Unachieved national rights thus remain a major obstacle for fulfilling women's rights. (WLAC) Children and youth pay a particular high price in the ongoing conflict. They have been victims of violence of the Israeli army and settlers, targeted attacks, school closures, medical problems, post-traumatic stress and indoctrination. Both the Israeli army and militant Palestinian groups have been accused of violating the rights of children and causing injury and death.

The violations of the basic rights of Palestinians are exacerbated by the inability of both sides to reach a political agreement to end the long standing

occupation and conflict. The latest installment of peace talks ended in April 2014 without result, and the decision of the Israeli government to advance the settlement expansions despite protest from EU and USA doesn't give much hope for a new peace process. According to the last OCHA-report, an estimated 1.9 million or 42% of the Palestinians are people in need, half of them are children under 15. Despite Israel's violations of IHL and the opposition of several Israeli ministers against the establishment of a Palestinian state, the international community does not seem determined to put pressure on the government to accept the two state solution. The reaction of the Israeli government on the BDS-campaigns from some NGOs shows that it is afraid of sanctions. However despite condemnations and some hard talk, no formal sanctions have been discussed at international level.

3.2 ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION

Since the start of the occupation, Israel has installed a path of unequal development that mainly added cheap labor and low-level processes to the occupying power. It has only allowed very narrow channels for economy, and it cannot be underestimated that during the peace process this situation did not get better. On the contrary, in general the economic hardship increased. Many of the most pernicious changes that can be witnessed today in Palestine, started during the peace process. Some of the most damaging measures affecting Palestinian development were a direct result of the Oslo agreements, and this is insufficiently taken into account by the donor community.

Throughout the peace process, the occupation's economic foundations remained intact. This was even reflected in the 1994 Paris Protocol. Hereby Israel was allowed to continue to apply military law on Palestine, maintain control over the key factors of production: land, water, labor and capital and to keep control over the external borders. Even if the PA ran the civil and economic affairs of 93% of the

Palestinians (excluding East-Jerusalem), it had no sovereign control over land and resources. The economic protocol did not give the PA the necessary means to achieve growth, Israel retained control over Palestinian international trade as well as over internal movement in Palestine. (Lagerquist) Through a series of different measures, such as the expansion of settlements, the construction of bypass roads and the restrictions on the freedom of movement, Israel achieved in maintaining a 'matrix of control'. (Halper, 2000) Furthermore, by dividing Palestine in zones A, B and C, Israel disengaged from the heavily populated areas while maintaining its effective control over the entire territory. Even if it lost some means of control, Israel continued to dominate the economy through the institutionalization of new restrictions.

A 2014 World Bank report paints a gloomy picture of the declining Palestinian economy. While the average yearly economic growth between 2006 and 2011 only rose by 2%, it declined to 1.9% in 2013, and is negative since the first quarter of 2014. Preliminary estimates indicated a decrease in GDP in Palestine by 2.5% during 2014 compared with 2013; GDP per capita has decreased by more than 5% during 2014 compared with 2013. A quarter of the Palestinian population lives in poverty, with the rate in Gaza twice as high as that in the West Bank, as Palestinian businesses were crippled by the restrictions on movement of people and goods and three devastating wars in the last 6 years that destroyed a lot of civilian infrastructure. Some numbers are telling: only 11% of formal firms have more than 20 workers compared to 35% in comparable lower-middle income countries. One out of 6 Palestinians in the West Bank and nearly every second person in Gaza were unemployed, even before the recent conflict. Young people and women are particularly discriminated against in access to employment: 40% of young men and 63% of young women are unemployed. The World Bank concludes: "Without immediate action by the Palestinian Authority, donors and the Government of Israel to revitalize the economy and improve the business climate, a return to vio-

lence as we have seen in recent years will remain a clear and present danger."

Palestine reports chronic trade deficits due to the territory's inability to access key resources, difficulty to penetrate external markets and because of the mobility restrictions. Palestine mainly exports cement, base metals, iron and steel, food and beverages, furniture, plastics and dairy products. Palestine mainly imports oil, food, vegetables, machinery, metals, vehicles, chemicals, livestock, beverages and salt. Palestine's main trading partner is Israel (accounting for around 74% of total trade). Other trading partners include China, Turkey, Germany, Italy and France.

Israel's control over Palestine means it can exert enormous power over Palestinian livelihoods. This can be illustrated with one clear example, olive trees. It is estimated that 800,000 olive trees have been uprooted by Israeli authorities since 1967 (Oxfam). As a result, the 80,000 Palestinian families that the UN claims are economically reliant on the olive harvest lose \$12.3m each year. At the same time, Israel is also a major source of Palestinian livelihoods. According to the latest ILO-report, some 87,000 Palestinians aged over 15 (around 10% of all those with jobs) are employed in Israel and its settlements. The majority is employed in the construction sector, followed by manufacturing and agriculture. However, a survey by Palestine's main trade union found that only 11% of workers in Israeli settlements said they had job security, over half received less than the minimum wage and 65% had been exposed to toxic substances. According to Human Rights Watch, Palestinian minors, as young as under 11, are used as cheap labor force for the agricultural industry in Israeli settlements.

The Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip has led to a man-made humanitarian crisis. Over 80 % of the population is dependent on humanitarian aid. The destruction of the legal economy means that illegal activity is essential for Gaza's economic survival. Weapons, fuel, food, people and even vehicles regularly passed through the tunnels under the

Gaza-Egypt border. The destruction of most of the smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt in the fall of 2013 – an indirect result of the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood and the election of general al-Sisi – was a major blow to the weak Palestinian economy. Together with the military operation ‘Protective Edge’ one year later, this has resulted in a decline of the economic activity by around 80-90%. The declining availability of basic produce has resulted in a sharp rise in prices. Officially imported goods also tend to be more expensive than elsewhere, the goods being taxed two times upon entry, once by Israel and once by the de facto government of Gaza.

The estimated one million Palestinians who have been fled in 1948 and have established themselves abroad, serve as a vital lifeline for Palestinians who remain in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a percentage of its GDP, Palestine is one of the most dependent economies in the world on remittances. The latest data from IMF in 2010 shows that 17% of GDP were received as personal remittances.

The number of Palestinian women in the labor force remains among the lowest in the world despite an increase during the past decade. The female labor participation rate in Palestine in 2014 was only 19.4%, compared to 25 %in the rest of the Arab world (Al-Shabaka), and a global average of 51%. The report also confirmed there’s still a gender gap in wages, women’s median daily wage is 84% men’s. Women are mainly employees in either the public (30%) or private (26%) sectors, while self-employed women were largely contributing family workers (23%).

Decent work

Most of the input on decent work has been integrated in this subchapter and in the subchapter on ‘health’. It shows indeed that this topic is relevant and is also a cross-cutting issue in analyzing and addressing the situation in Palestine. According to the ITUC 2014 index of labor rights, Palestine is rated 5+, which stands for: "rights are not guaranteed due to the absence of the rule of law". It is one of the 9 most poorly ranked countries where

workers' rights are violated. The fundamental rights of workers are generally not respected by private employers, particularly in Israeli settlements where Palestinians do not enjoy any form of rights in the workplace. 50% of private sector workers have no employment contract, 75% did not receive severance pay in 2012 and only 35% of women received maternity leave with pay. The unionization rate is low, at 22%. In the specific context of Palestine, the neoliberal policies promoting the flexibility of the labor market together with the predominance of the informal economy, weaken unions. They will need new strategies in building their capacity to take address better the demands of the labor force in the informal economy.

3.3 ANALYSES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION

ENVIRONMENT		SOURCE
Surface (6220 km ²) –share of forest	1.5% (2008)	Min of Agriculture
National Ecological Footprint (ha/capita)	0.74 (2010)	GFN

The West Bank has a varied topography consisting of central highlands, where most of the population lives, and semi-arid rocky slopes, an arid rift valley and rich plains in the north and west. In all, about 12% of the land is desert, eroded or saline. Gaza is a narrow, low-lying stretch of sand dunes along the eastern Mediterranean Sea. It forms a foreshore plain that slopes gently up to an elevation of 90 meters. The sea is warm and saline and is affected by water outflow from the River Nile. The climate in the West Bank can be characterized as hot and dry during summer and cool and wet during winter, while the climate in Gaza is more temperate even though it borders the desert. The principal

water resources available to Palestinians include groundwater, springs and harvested rainwater.

Water is with land on of the main inputs of Palestinian agricultural production, yet the Palestinian population has been denied access to its water sources by Israel.,. In the West Bank, irrigation water is supplied by groundwater wells and springs. Some 80% of the groundwater is being kept by Israel for the use of the settlements and their supporting structure. Of what's left, 40% is used for agricultural purposes. In Gaza, the main issue surrounding water is the quality and availability. The coastal aquifer, Gaza's main water source, has been continuously over-pumped for decades, which has led to contamination by salted water. The lack of wastewater treatment has contributed to making 90 to 95% of Gaza's main water supply unfit for drinking and problematic even in terms of agricultural use. The excessive and uncontrolled use of fertilizers has exacerbated this situation, and has had a negative impact on soil quality.

Water allocation from the Jordan River has been a central issue of both the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, the Dead Sea water level has dropped at a rate of about 1m per year, losing 1/3 of its surface, prompting the discussion on a controversial canal project at international level. The Oslo agreement reflected Israel's intention to restrict Palestinian water consumption and maintain its hegemony over the mountain aquifer in the West Bank.

The Middle East is a meeting point of many escalating environmental threats. This is particularly the case in Palestine. Long term environmental degradation has occurred over the decades spanning several conflicts. In an already densely populated area, there are additional problems of scarcity and quality of water resources and land, rapid population growth, long-lasting refugee situation, climate change, desertification and land degradation. Gaza is dependent on the coastal aquifer, which is currently over-used resulting in falling water levels and degrading water quality due to

seawater infiltration. The region is facing a rapid decline in biodiversity, because of population growth, urbanization, global warming, atmospheric and water pollution, the incorrect introduction of non-native animals and plants and the destruction of habitats.

There are problems directly linked to the conflict besides more long-term environmental degradation. The conflict related issues include land clearing, obstacles such as curfews and closures to the transport of waste, difficulties in obtaining spare parts for environmental facilities and collateral damage to the environmental infrastructure caused by military action. The longer-term environmental degradation is evident in the pollution of groundwater resources, the lack of proper waste management, shortcomings in environmental administration and legislation. Environmental health is an issue in the Palestine, in particular in the Gaza Strip where unacceptably high levels of contaminants, including nitrates, have been found in water. Limited wastewater and solid waste treatment, localized air pollution and poor occupational safety and health present serious health hazards. (UNEP)

3.4 ANALYSIS OF THE THEMES OF INTERVENTION

3.4.1 EDUCATION

A. GENERAL BACKGROUND

Number of students at school in 2013/2014 was at 1,151,702. (PCBS); the education rate (15+) in 2013 was at 98,4 % (M) and 94,1% (F). 95,000 school-aged children are out of school. (UNESCO, 2014). The gross enrolment rate for the age group of 18-24 year olds is more than 25.8 %. (EC, 2012), Gender Parity Index for tertiary education is at 1.51, and from 1994/1995 to 2010/2011, the number of schools went from 1474 to 2652. (PCBS)

Education is highly valued in Palestinian society. The vast majority of Palestinian children have ac-

cess to basic education: children with refugee status through the UNRWA education system, others mainly through the governmental education system. However, many children underperform and drop out of school. Yet, the rate of enrolment in higher education institutions is relatively high.

Since the establishment of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education in 1994, progress has been made in education planning and management. Supported by development partners, the Ministry progressively developed its capacity to implement and monitor the Education Development Strategic Plans. The goals for 2014-2019 are focused on 3 axes: access, quality, and management. This included an increased focus on quality through thematic strategies such as the National Teacher Education Strategy, the draft Early Childhood Development (ECD) Strategy and the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Strategy.

The education sector suffers from numerous challenges: unavailability of qualified teachers, inadequate school infrastructure, a chronic shortage of classrooms, especially in Gaza, restrictions on building, expanding and rehabilitating schools, large classrooms, impeded access to educational facilities and traditional methods of teaching. These factors result in rising dropout rates, low learning achievements and, in some cases, displacement. (UNESCO, 2014)

Over the last decades, Palestinian women and girls' presence has increased at all education levels and they are now graduating from universities at a higher rate than Palestinian men. However, they face higher unemployment and are thus an underutilized source of human capital. (RASIT)

Despite recent efforts made at policy level to better include children and students with disabilities, their integration in mainstream schools remains challenging for several reasons and barriers faced. Children with disabilities are often excluded from education, or for a portion of them, hosted in spe-

cial education schools, mostly (no to say solely) run by local CSOs.

B. CHALLENGES TO THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION

25% of students have suffered from psychological violence by their peers and (28%) by teachers. (UNESCO, 2014) During 'Cast Lead', 14 of the 15 higher education institutions in Gaza were damaged (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attacks) During 'Protective Edge' 232 schools were damaged and 29 schools were totally destroyed. (DCI-Palestine)

In the school environment several forms of violence are prevalent: including psychological and occupation-related violence. Additionally, armed conflict and hostilities result in direct attacks on the education sector, including killings and injuries of students and teachers, and damages to schools. The majority of incidents occur in connection with military operations in Gaza, and with Israeli administrative and military arrangements in Area C. Persistent rights violations: exposure to violence, arrest and detention of minors, nightly arrests by the Israeli army and impeded access to educational facilities all negatively impact the provision of education.

Children face risks every day they go to school. These risks affect boys and girls differently, as girls are more likely to drop out of school as a result of impeded access, military actions around schools, and restrictive checkpoints; whereas, boys are put more at risk to confrontations with the military either after school or during the school commute. (Save the Children, 2015) Children across the West Bank, mainly in Area C and Hebron, lack protected access to education and face dangers and obstacles on their way to and from school. They must travel long distances and are confronted with delays and harassment at checkpoints. They are exposed to the risks of settler and military violence. (EAPPI, 2013) Furthermore, at least 39 schools in Area C are facing demolition or stop-work orders. (OCHA, 2013) Finally, according to a barrier as-

assessment conducted in 2015 by Handicap International, the main barriers faced by children with disabilities to attend mainstream schools are lack of awareness on rights and inclusive policies, lack of accessibility of schools, limited awareness on how to include children with disabilities, lack of adapted teaching material and curriculum, and negative attitudes towards disability issue.

In Gaza, schooling at all levels has been disrupted mainly by armed conflict and the closure. Israel's restrictions on the movement of people and goods has choked the education system and prevents the construction of 250 needed schools. Increasingly, students, teachers and education institutions have been exposed to violence and frequent power cuts hamper students' abilities to complete their homework. This contributes to the fact that almost half of Palestinian students do not meet the basic learning outcomes. A UNESCO-report has documented the "material, human and educational damage" sustained by Gaza's higher education institutions (HEIs) during 2014 'Operation Protective Edge'. The UN agency's conclusion: that "higher education institutions were directly targeted during the hostilities". (Brookings institute, 2014) Moreover, the closure has impeded student mobility between Gaza and the West Bank. Hundreds of students who were offered places at foreign universities were unable to leave Gaza. Hamas has also contributed to this dire situation by often barring students from travel. Palestinian armed groups have damaged UNRWA schools and accidentally hit a school. Furthermore, in July 2014, UNRWA has discovered rockets at a vacant school.

Since 1967, the municipality of Jerusalem has systematically allocated less resources to Palestinian schools in annexed East Jerusalem. The school system also suffers from discrimination in funding allocated by the municipality for basic facilities such as water, electricity and maintenance. (ACRI, IrAmim, 2013) This is demonstrated by the shortage of 1,000 classrooms in Palestinian schools. Furthermore, the Wall has had detrimental effects on Palestinian university students. One-third of the land belonging to the Al Quds University lies on the

western side of the Wall and is no longer accessible. The number of students from the West Bank has decreased dramatically, as they cannot reach the campus. (UN, 2007)

TVET centers are operating under limited and fragmented certification and oversight from several ministries. Vocational education has suffered from a governance vacuum, society's attitudes, generally negative, limited involvement of and sharing of responsibilities with the private sector, limited financing of the sector. The relevance of TVET to the labor market and the socio-economic development needs is weak. Individuals with special needs face several obstacles and challenges that prevent their effective participation in society on equal terms with others. Students with disabilities are still not fully accommodated in the education system and further improvements and adaptations need to be made.

Insufficient funding is an ongoing major concern for tertiary education and it is having a seriously negative impact on the quality and relevance of Higher Education Institutions. In the structure of total expenditure, about 94 % is allocated for the payment of salaries and operational costs, and 6 % for development expenditure. The professional development of staff members is restricted due to the absence of regular fellowship and scholarship programs to upgrade their qualifications and their teaching skills. The weak link of programs to the needs of the labor market is presently a central issue in all national development programs and projects.

Finally, the decreasing funding and attention for the Palestinian cultural sector, by both donors and the PA, negatively affects the education sector. However, culture is still viewed by many local CSOs as a relevant medium for extracurricular activities allowing youth to complete their education, express themselves and develop skills. Decades of occupation, geographical fragmentation and isolation have disconnected Palestinians from each other and made it impossible for collective cultural development, deforming the cultural identity and

heritage. Jerusalem and Gaza have been isolated and a stronger adherence to conservative trends has also been witnessed, with a parallel marginalization of art as promoter for positive changes and new ideas.

As a result, children in Palestine are out of touch with their own culture. Lack of public safe spaces leaves Palestinian children and youth without sufficient creative outlets to channel the negative energy they face daily. There is also a limited promotion of culture as a vector of democratization within society, government institutions and the media has not played an active role in further advancing performing arts. The focus has always been and remains on political issues.

3.4.2 HEALTH

In its final report, the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health has drawn attention to the effects on health of low income, inadequate housing, unsafe workplaces, and lack of access to health facilities. In the Lancet's series "Health in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", researchers elaborated on these findings by introducing 'conflict' as an additional social determinant of health. Conflict not only causes injury, death, and disability, but it also increases physical displacement, discrimination and marginalization, and prevents access to health services. The military occupation and the accompanying repressive measure, including arbitrary arrest, forced displacement, house demolitions, land confiscation, among other violations and threats to human security affect the health and mental well-being and should therefore be addressed in a comprehensive, rights-based approach of health.

Some important indicators (according WHO, 2013):

- *Crude birth rate: 32.7 per 1,000 and crude death rate is 3.9% per 1,000*
- *14.7% of the population is under 5 and 40.2% from 0 to 14.*
- *Under 5 mortality rate is 21 per 1,000 - Infant mortality rate is 18.8 per 1,000*

- *% of women child bearing age of total population: 24.3 - Total fertility rate: 4.2*
- *% of pregnant women attending antenatal care out of total live births (prenatal rate): 40.5*
- *% of delivery in institutions: 98.5*

Health facilities: Number of hospital: 81 - Population/hospital ratio: 53,003 - Number of beds: 5,996
Number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants: 20.8.

The division between the PA and the Hamas government has effectively created two Ministries of Health institutions in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip and fragmented the decision-making related to operational issues, investment planning and government initiated reforms in the health sector. The blockade of Gaza is leading to a steady degradation of the health system and deterioration of the quality of care provided. Health workers are unable to leave the Strip for continuous education; maintenance of medical equipment is severely hampered by restrictions on importing spare parts, calibrating equipment and specialized staff from equipment providers. Gaza's healthcare sector was pushed to its limits due to the number of casualties during the conflict: many of the injured did not receive adequate care. With hospitals stretched beyond capacity and limited rehabilitation capacities, persons with injuries were discharged too early, did not receive proper follow-up or post-operative care, and did not have access to rehabilitation services and assistive devices.

Health services are provided by five main entities: the MoH, NGOs, UNRWA, the private sector, and the medical military services. The MoH is the main provider of primary and secondary health care. NGOs are the main providers for tertiary, emergency/ambulance services, and rehabilitative care. UNRWA provides mostly primary services to the refugee population and the still quite nascent private sector provides secondary care. Most of specialized services are only available outside the Gaza Strip and West Bank; patients are referred to East Jerusalem, Jordan, Egypt and Israel at considerable expenses to Palestine. However, MoH remains

weak in the organization, regulation, and supervision of the health sector, and in the coordination of policy making and planning among health-care providers, especially those of the private sector. Government liabilities have considerably exceeded the revenues from health insurance, co-payments and the general tax revenues allocated to the health sector. International donors financed a significant portion of health expenditures. Total health expenditure as a proportion of GDP is high (13%), raising concerns about sustainability. The Social Security Act is not enforced and offers no guaranteed income and access to health for all citizens. There is no public system of general health insurance, neither a tripartite social security institution and we can observe a significant lack of coverage for occupational accidents, unemployment, health care and maternity.

The Palestinian population is going through a rapid epidemiological and demographic transition. The health status of the Palestinian population is comparable to that in other low middle income countries. Some communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections persist. Viral hepatitis A, B and C are endemic. Although data of HIV infection suggest a low prevalence, it is assumed that many cases are undetected. In 2004, heart diseases caused the highest number of adult deaths. Field observations continued to indicate a growing problem of stress-related disorders and mental health problems, including family violence, domestic abuse, and violence against women, children and youth. There is a range of family and child protection services for vulnerable and marginalized groups, including mental health and psychosocial support, foster care programs, safe houses and emergency referral centers for women and children subjected to family violence. However, the coverage and quality of social welfare services is extremely limited.

While the majority of the Palestinian citizens are in a vulnerable situation in this precarious humanitarian context, especially in the Gaza Strip, persons with disabilities (PwDs) are among the most vulnerable and their needs among the most critical.

The prevalence of disability was about 7% according to the wide definition of disability, 2,9% according to the narrow definition (PCBS, 2011). PwDs in the Palestinian territory face a wide range of challenges: limited access to services, unfriendly physical environment, and negative social attitudes, among others. In addition, women and girls are facing a double discrimination due to their impairment and their gender. Persons with disabilities are in dire need for both specific service related to their disability but also to be better included in general health services, especially primary health care.

3.4.3 GOVERNANCE

The Oslo peace process aimed at fulfilling the Palestinian right to self-determination. Civil and political responsibilities were delegated to the Palestinian Authority (PA) that was established in 1994. As this allowed Israel to give up its obligations towards the occupied population, it agreed to the development of Palestinian institutions. Israel insisted however on retaining its economic and political control. A limited degree of state-building, involving the establishment of a domestic police force, and basic services such as health care and education, was desirable in order to have control over the population without bearing the brunt of the occupation. However, Israel also promoted the development of a strong Palestinian regime. This is one of the causes of the development of an authoritarian PA. The observance of the rule of law, good governance and financial transparency were not the main priorities. Much attention was given to the policing system. The international community also downplayed the PA's obligations under human rights treaties, even if its authoritarian tendencies were clear from the start. (Nathan Brown, 2003)

The PA's failure to live up to its duties created popular discontent. For this and other reasons, such as the clash between the leadership that came back from exile after 1993 and the local leaders, the Palestinian leadership lacked legitima-

cy. It resorted to corruption and patronage. Against this background, Hamas was able to gain popularity among the Palestinian population. It presented itself as a clean alternative for the corrupt leadership of Fatah.

The security forces are taking a powerful position in society and remain largely outside the official governance system. At the same time, while political instability and powerful non-state actors pose challenges to the integrity system, CSOs and the media have significant room to maneuver and are sometimes even able to work in conjunction with official bodies to promote anti-corruption initiatives. Officially, a democratic electoral process is in place, which should ensure a channel of citizen influence upon the political system. However, after the 2006 elections, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has been dysfunctional in both the West Bank and Gaza, preventing democratic accountability.

A recent study shows that as many as 81% of the Palestinians believe there is corruption in PA's institutions. Corruption should not be perceived as merely a matter of administrative and financial wrongdoing committed by irresponsible individuals whose behavior is driven by greed and personal interests. The scandals that Palestinians debate from time to time – such as embezzlement of public funds, misappropriation of resources, and nepotism – are an outcome of longstanding corruption embedded in the underlying power structure that governs the Palestinian political system and that were rooted in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) prior to the Oslo process. (Al Shabaka, 2015)

In recent years the efforts made to fight corruption have been largely “technical” in nature, and have focused on such issues as drafting codes of conduct, improving recruitment procedures, and developing preventive measures to deal with specific violations. While such measures are necessary they cannot be sufficient if the political root causes of corruption are ignored. The nature of corruption specific to the PA needs to be understood in order

to be able to tackle it effectively. The absence of important NIS (National Integrity Systems) pillars like an Ombudsman or anti-corruption agencies makes it also difficult for citizens to report malpractices and clear procedures regulating how to report corruption and mechanisms and protect whistleblowers from retaliation are absent.

An analysis of the CSOs can be found below (4.1.2)

3.4.4 AGRICULTURE

Agriculture, including livestock, has always been deeply rooted in the Palestinian society and culture and is a very important economic activity, even though the share of the sector in the Palestinian GDP has dropped from 13% to 5,5% between 1993 and 2014. This share has been gradually replaced by food aid and (relatively expensive) imports, which has led the Palestinians to be among the most food dependent people in the world. Agricultural development is crucial in the improvement of food security and as a source of income and employment, but agricultural production plays also an important role as a supplier for various transformative industries as well a consumer of inputs and services from other sectors. Plant production includes various branches of vegetables, fruits and field crops (wheat, barley, etc.), whereas the livestock production specializes in sheep, goats, cattle, poultry, bees and fish. Besides these *traditional* roles of the sector, and considering the particular context of the Israeli occupation, agricultural development is also a major tool to combat confiscations and forced displacement.

In the West Bank, the local production is self-sufficient for a range of products (olive oil, poultry, grapes, etc.) but food insecurity remains high overall (30%). However, the limitations on the development possibilities are important, and are mainly the consequence of the Israeli occupation and associated control over the economic space. These restrictions include but are not limited to permanent closures or access limitations, forced displacement of herders' communities, predomi-

nance of Israeli products on the local market, bans on importations, additional costs for inputs due to Israeli intermediaries, etc. The fact that more than 60% of arable land is located in area C—under total control of Israel—constitutes a major obstacle in the development of the sector. Finally, other factors that are also limiting development are the declining productivity for small ruminants and some crops due to the soil degradation, a weak furniture of agricultural services (finance and insurance, training, veterinary assistance, marketing, etc.) and the fact that crops depend on seasonal rainfall, with only 20% of land benefiting from irrigation. International trade could have the potential to create enormous wealth, but without a drastic change in the control matrix of Israel this potential will remain untapped.

In the Gaza Strip, Israel applies restrictions to the access to and to fishing areas along the Gaza Strip coast. Since the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009, Palestinians have been totally or partially prevented from accessing land in a 500 to 1.000 meters buffer zone from the border fence with Israel, which encompass some 35% of the agricultural land. The access to the sea has been mostly limited to 3 nautical miles from the shore, only 15% of the coastal areas they should have access to under the Oslo Agreements. Access restrictions are generally enforced through the use of live fire.

Today agriculture still remains a significant source of employment for both men and women, representing respectively 10% and 20% of the Palestinian labor force. The contribution of women in Palestinian agriculture is significant, yet often invisible and rarely recognized. Palestinian rural women contribute largely to extensive chores, factory work and farm work. Despite this major contribution, an estimated 40% of rural Palestinian women at working age carry out unpaid work. Moreover, they do not control agricultural revenues. This marginalizes their role in the production process. (FAO, 2011) There is a lack of focus in the agricultural sector on women and the essential role they play in agriculture. Considering that 90 percent of unpaid family members working in agriculture are

women, they are not adequately represented and recognized in their agricultural communities. There remains a great potential to capitalize on the knowledge, skills, and motivation that women have in relation to this sector.

Overall—and this is not limited to agriculture but can be extended to the vast majority of economic activities—an unfair and dysfunctional economic system and limited political representation in Palestine restricts sustainable access to and control over agricultural resources and inputs and creates barriers that result in persistent economic vulnerability for Palestinian women, men and youth.

3.4.5 RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

The context in Palestine is one of a protracted protection crisis with dire humanitarian consequences. Violence peaked in 2014 following a number of incidents, retaliatory killings and military operations. Palestinians are subject to forced displacements, a phenomenon primarily driven by policies and practices related to the ongoing occupation in the West Bank, particularly in Area C and East Jerusalem. The Israeli authorities continue settlement expansion, contrary to international law, at the expense of the housing, livelihood, relief and rehabilitation needs of Palestinian communities. Amongst them, herders' communities in the so-called E1 area are particularly vulnerable. Although some long-standing movement restrictions have improved recently, it remains restricted by a complex system of physical and administrative measures, such as the wall, checkpoints, roadblocks, and a permit system, undermining livelihoods and access to basic services, as well as hindering the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance. The implementation of humanitarian projects is thus impeded by restrictions on access to East Jerusalem and limitations on projects that involve building, expanding or rehabilitating infrastructure in Area C, where Israel does not hesitate to seize or destroy donor-funded projects.

The Gaza Strip is home to a population of more than 1,7 million people, including 1,2 million Palestine refugees. For the last decade, the socio-economic situation in Gaza has been in steady decline. Years of conflict and closure have left 80 percent of the population dependent on international assistance. The tightened blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip since 2007 and facilitated by Egypt, has decimated lives and livelihoods, resulting in the impoverishment and de-development of a highly skilled and well-educated society. Over half a million Palestine refugees in Gaza live in the eight recognized Palestine refugee camps, which have one of the highest population densities in the world. The blockade has had a devastating impact on Palestine refugees, including those living in Palestine refugee camps. Unemployment continues to be at unprecedented levels, particularly among young people. Humanitarian needs sharply increase after each military conflict, while long-standing access restrictions and funding constraints, resulted in shortages of food and equipment. The Israeli authorities issued a Temporary Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) late 2014, which strictly regulates building materials to enter the Gaza Strip, at an amount and pace that will take until 2115 to reconstruct housing, schooling and health structure. Without restoring the existing infrastructure and social and economic rehabilitation a transition to enable populations to return to their previous livelihood or develop a new livelihood is impossible.

Under pressure of the European Parliament, the EC ordered OCHA to produce a monthly incident-tracking report for Area C and East Jerusalem. According to OCHA, 122 donor-funded structures were destroyed up to 2013, 51 of which were EU-funded. The NGO-community has welcomed the monitoring but deplores that the EU did not make steps to claim compensation and hold Israel accountable for its violations of international law.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY, THE DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITIES AND THE GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THEIR MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL PARTNERS

4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND THEIR MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL PARTNERS

4.1.1 DEFINITION OF 'CIVIL SOCIETY'

The NGAs apply a broad definition of 'civil society': We include all non-state actors who are non-profit and have the intention to defend the interests of people based on the idea of equality. It includes trade unions, professional groups, religious groups, NGOs, networks or platforms, community organizations, cultural groups, etc.... Civil society groups are active on areas like:

- raising awareness, mobilization and advocacy by and for individuals and groups;
- creating space for the freedom to organize social, religious, cultural and artistic activities;
- opposing the moves from governments to get more control over public life and space;
- strengthening and supporting the movement for more democracy;
- improving the daily lives of people by providing specific services, or help them to get better access to services;
- in particularly for this CCA, we can add that we define CSOs as groups opposing the occupation and the policies of the Israeli government.

4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN PALESTINE

Before the Oslo Accords in 1993 there was a vibrant Palestinian social movement. Under occupation and in the absence of a state, many popular committees in all sectors of Palestinian society organized themselves to take their life into their own hands. After the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority many grass-roots organizations became aid-dependent NGOs focusing on specific social issues and service delivery without tackling the root causes of violation of basic rights. Many of these organizations lost linkages with communities and original constituencies. In the West Bank, there has been a proliferation of registered NGOs, leading to an increased difficulty in distinguishing and identifying different kinds of associations.

Today, Palestinian civil society is characterized by many divisions, such as geographical division, political and administrative division, a gap between generations, and social division, which are reflected in the fragmentation of civil society and grass-roots organizations. Tackling these divisions is a major challenge to address the structural drivers of the right to social and economic justice in Palestine. The special context of East Jerusalem produces a two-fold set of challenges for CSOs. On the one side, their legitimate existence and activity are at risk in a context of occupation and repression; while on the other side the increasing social exclusion conditions create a growing demand for services and for rights' protection activities.

The blockade of Gaza dramatically affects CSOs. Firstly, they are hampered by the infringements on the freedom of movement and goods. Secondly, there is a decrease of trust among the organizations, with constituencies and with political authorities. Thirdly, there is little space for political dialog and participation in governance, a lack of access for qualified human resources, equipment and materials, and a dependency on external donors and resources. Lastly, organizations have also

been subject to special requirements imposed by the Hamas de facto authority, which are restricting their activities for example by requesting them to obtain permits from the General Police Command for organizing public activities or events, or by pressuring for more detailed information on the organization under threat of dissolution. (EU country roadmap for engagement with civil society, 2014) Despite all this, CSOs are often assuming a role of change catalysts, fostering social change.

The relation between authorities and civil society organizations is often ambiguous. CSOs engage with the authorities through advocacy and participation in sector-based clusters. Yet, they esteem that the authorities fulfill their role, partly due to the deteriorating economic and political situation and a lack of resources. At the local level it's easier for CSOs to engage with authorities and have their recommendations implemented.

Empowerment of communities and strong social movements are indispensable to change power relations to the benefit of the majority of the Palestinian people. The linkage between social organizations and communities and their constituencies is crucial to start from the real needs of the people. As the Israeli occupation remains the most important obstacle for social justice and sovereign development in Palestine, it is paramount to overcome divisions and strengthen the unity in the Palestinian social movement, which tasks are double: struggling against the ongoing occupation as well as building a democratic Palestinian society in which the active participation of women and youth are indispensable.

TRADE UNIONS

Affiliation rates in trade unions are very low in Palestine. This is partially due to the high level of unemployment, especially in the Gaza Strip and the big share of informal work, but also to the low awareness of their rights amongst workers and the lack of effectiveness of some unions partially due to political interference in their functioning. Men have also a higher affiliation rate. Levels of organization are particularly low in the industrial sector

and sectors with high level of informality (such as construction or agriculture sector). Obtaining the effective right to organize and collective bargaining is an ongoing struggle in the public as well as in the private sector.

The main general trade unions in the West Bank are the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU) –had a monopole on workers’ representation until 2011 -, the General Federation of Independent Trade Unions –Palestine (GFITUP), and the General Union of Palestinian Workers. Various public sector unions have also been created on a sectorial base: general union for public employees, universities and college employees, health workers, teachers, etc...

There is no unified legislation concerning trade associations: in the West Bank, freedom of association and the right to organize are guaranteed by Basic Law and some dispositions of Palestinian Labor Law of the year 2000, while in the Gaza Strip, a very restrictive Union Law was adopted by Hamas in 2013, whose standards are well below international norms on freedom of association and the right to organize.

FARMERS GROUPS

There are 3 major farmers Unions: a) The Union of Agricultural Work Committee (UAWC) which was established in 1986. Nowadays UAWC implements various projects with different donors and partnerships, notably to create job opportunities and distributing production inputs to farmers, supporting (small-scale) household economy, providing drinking water resources for farmers and countryside inhabitants, in addition to programs of distributing aid, and work for food. It is also active in international agricultural associations; b) the Palestinian Agricultural Development Association (PARC) was launched in the late 1970s. It strives to “develop the agricultural sector, strengthen the resilience of farmers, reach out to the poor and marginalized groups and their CBO’s, mobilize and develop the capabilities of rural people to enable them to control their resources, through the work of a distinguished professional teams and a loyal volun-

teers.”; c) the Palestinian Farmers' Union (PFU) provides technical and organizational support to Palestinian farmers. The PFU aims to represents the interests of Palestinian farmers, it encourages responsible investment and social responsibility, and supports branch level development projects.

PRIVATE SECTOR

The Palestinian private sector largely remains confined to primarily small-sized firms operating with low capital investment, in a fragmented domestic market, and in relative isolation from the global economy. A 2014 World Bank report provides empirical evidence that political instability resulting from conflict, military rule, violence, political division, and lack of free movement and access to resources and markets remains the key obstacle to economic growth.

MEDIA

Both the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and the de facto authorities in Gaza exercise tight control over the information disseminated by the media. There have been cases of media content being censored and journalists being detained and persecuted for voicing political opinions and for reporting on human rights violations. The Palestinian Press and Publications Law includes a clear guarantee of journalists’ right to protect their sources. However, there have been reports of journalists being pressured to reveal them. Journalistic practice is impeded by an environment of insecurity. Human rights organizations have recorded a high number of violations against media workers, including arbitrary arrests and detention, physical attacks and raids of media outlets. This situation has led many media professionals to resort to self-censorship. Palestinian journalists also suffer from restrictions on movement. (UNESCO, 2014)

REPRESENTATIVES OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

The General Union of persons with Disabilities (GUDP) and its branches have been for long the main representative of persons with disabilities. In

line with geographical and political divisions of the Palestinian context, Disable People Organizations (DPO) have been created to represent different groups in different areas. The DPOs are advocating the duty bearers for improved inclusion of disability issues and respect of human rights and laws. Coordination of these DPOs remain a major challenge to date.

HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTE (HEI)

The CCA-Vademecum provides two broad categories of actors: “civil society” and “decentralized authorities and public institutions”. As HEI are autonomous organizations with a public interest, and cannot be considered as purely governmental institutions, they are categorized as civil society here. There are three different types of institutions in Higher Education. These are governmental, public (established by NGOs), and private institutions. Most HEIs in Palestine are public. More than 213 000 students are enrolled in these institutions. It is estimated that the gross enrolment rate for the age group of 18-24 year olds is more than 25.8 %.

Today the Palestinian higher education system is comprised of 49 accredited post-secondary education institutions distributed between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 34 of these institutions are located in the West Bank which range between traditional universities, university colleges, community colleges and an Open University (13, 15, 20 and one respectively). They offer nearly 300 fields of study for students, of whom 57% are female. These institutions provide programs that range from Education, Arts and Humanities to Natural and Medical Sciences, ICT and Engineering. The Palestinian universities are predominantly non-governmental institutions. There are currently 16 scientific research centers at the Palestinian universities in the fields of: agriculture, environment, water, energy and health.

The 1998 law on higher education identified the following types of tertiary education: Universities (Al-Jamiaah), University colleges (Alkulliah Al-Jamiaaiah), Polytechnics (Alpolytechnik), Community colleges There are 4 types of HEIs: government

HEIs, which are run by the Palestinian Authority, and UNRWA, Private, and Public run HEIs. Most HEIs are public and originally created and owned by local charity associations and NGOs.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN ISRAEL

The Israeli society is quite diverse and includes both progressive and conservative forces, working in almost every realm of life, from human rights, democracy and coexistence to gender equality and women empowerment, education and culture, social justice, religious freedom and inter-religious relationships or welfare. Recent legislation discriminates in favor of service-oriented CSOs, to the detriment of social change, civilian and particularly human rights organizations. (EC, 2013)

The peace movement got more active after the Lebanon War in 1982, but declined due to the failing peace process in the nineties. However, a new generation of civil society organizations emerged after 2000, many of them are closely connected with Palestinian groups and among others are active in the field of legal assistance and protest against Israeli policy in Palestine.

4.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE NATIONAL AND DECENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, AND THEIR MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL PARTNERS

GOVERNMENT

The Palestinian government is the government of the State of Palestine. The ruling power is de facto split into two separate administrations. The first is Fatah-dominated Palestinian government which rules the West Bank areas A and B and is generally related to as the legal representative of the State of Palestine (and previously, the Palestinian National Authority). The other is the Hamas government, which is ruling the Gaza Strip. There are three levels of government, the central level, regional and municipal. The PA does not have a constitution. The Basic Law was approved in 2002 by

the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and signed by then President Arafat. The Basic Law provides for religious freedom, states that Islam is the official religion but also calls for respect and sanctity for other religions and that the principles of Shari'a (Islamic law) shall be the main source of legislation.

LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The governorates make up the regional level, they are under the direct control of the Ministry of Interior and are led by directors nominated by the President. They are 14 and are characterized by legal ambiguity in so much as no law or decree regulates their authority. In practice, they are in charge of the Palestinian police force within their region as well as coordinating some state services, such as health, education, transport. In 2014, there were 121 municipalities and 335 village councils. The 29 refugee camps fall directly under the jurisdiction of UNRWA. In Gaza, municipalities are the direct providers of essential daily services to their citizens and as such play a key role in recovery and reconstruction efforts.

Municipalities to a large degree depend on revenues for services and municipal fees and taxes. Municipal personnel in Gaza have not received regular payments for months, and currently only core personnel is reporting to work. While conditions vary slightly between municipalities, the operational capacity of municipalities has been compromised during the most critical period. Especially in the current recovery and reconstruction phase, it is vital that municipalities work at their maximum capacity. Municipalities have also suffered direct losses, their facilities and equipment have been destroyed and damaged throughout Gaza. These damages further undermine the operational capacity of the affected municipalities.

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (MOA)

Besides being responsible for drafting and implementing the national agricultural development plan (latest version NDP 2014-2016), the MoA is the public provider of agricultural (extension) ser-

vices such as research or trainings, through various departments, including the Agricultural extension and Rural development Department or the National Agricultural Research Center. Other departments offer (in coordination with other sectors) more specific services such as veterinary services, plant protection, land reclamation, soil and water marketing, finance services, etc. Overall, the quality, quantity and timing of provided services are inappropriate to the needs, and suffer from a lack of coordination with other actors in the sector resulting in overlap. The MoA also suffers from weak human capacities, lacking or insufficient legislation and shows a lack of interest for promoting small-scale agriculture.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH (MOH)

The MoH is responsible to govern and regulate the Palestinian health sector to ensure appropriate use of resources for a sustainable health delivery system. MoH is also responsible for ensuring the necessary laws and regulations are in place, stimulating partnerships with other services providers and sectoral partners, and managing resources. The MoH also leads and institutionalizes regulatory and planning activities in the health sector including accreditation and licensing. The MOH also is responsible for ensuring a sustainable health financing, reviewing and updating the health insurance system, as well as implementing specific area strategies such as the national health information strategy, national pharmaceutical strategy, national women and maternal health strategy, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) management strategy and others.

As the main health service provider in Palestine, the MOH aims to ensure equitable delivery of quality health services to all Palestinians in line with international, regional, and national standards within the framework of Palestinian laws and regulations, in particular, the Palestinian Public Health Law. The Health Unions and Syndicates are playing a main role to implement MoH laws and policies with respect to the health sector workforce including continuing education programs, and licensing and accreditation regulations. The health syndi-

cates will also support the MoH in the establishment of the human resources (HR) observatory, a national health workforce database to support policy and decision making.

HEALTH: NON GOVERNMENT SECTOR

International organizations and international community play a major role in supporting the sustainability and development of the Palestinian health sector. They jointly work with MoH on setting up basis, standards, and internationally adopted implementation methods. Donors comply with providing financial, logistic, and technical support to the health sector. They also have a major role for advocating the health situation in Palestine, through enhancing international awareness about the Palestinian health situation and the importance of continuous support to promote health system sustainability, also comply with aid effectiveness principles as defined by Paris agreement and the MoH national guidelines in this regard. The Public Health Institute (PHI) was established with cooperation with the WHO, to play a major role in strengthening health research, data analysis and health indicators analysis, strengthening NCDs prevention and surveillance programs.

The main non-government actors in the health sector are UNRWA, private and NGOs' health institutions. The private health sector plays a major role in economic development, NGOs and private sector actively participate and share with MoH institutional development, planning, M&E, compliance with the national policies and approved standards in service provision, rehab, continuing education, gender ... etc.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION (MoEHE)

Since 1994, the MoEHE has been responsible for managing and funding governmental schools as well as supervising schools run by the Israeli Ministry of Education and Jerusalem Municipality by the private sector. In Jerusalem, governmental schools are supervised by the Israeli Ministry of Education and Jerusalem Municipality. Other schools are supervised by the Islamic Waqf Department and

managed by the Palestinian MoEHE. Secondly, the UNRWA supervises schools enlisting Palestinian refugees throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Thirdly, private schools are supervised and funded by charity associations, religious communities and individuals.

The mission of the MoEHE is to ensure education for all, improve its quality and its standards in order to meet the learners' needs. Within the framework of Education Sector Working Group (ESWG), the MoEHE and key donors signed the Joint Financing Arrangement, a basket fund supporting the Education Development Strategic Plan.

Despite the full Israeli military and civil control in Area C and Jerusalem, MoEHE regards both areas as an integral part of its planning and budgeting efforts. Despite the political stalemate between West Bank and Gaza, the ministry has included Gaza in some planned intervention, such as school construction. Since its establishment, steady progress has been made in education planning and progress.

UNRWA

UNRWA is a relief and human development agency, originally intended to provide jobs on public works projects and direct relief for Arab Palestinians who fled or were expelled from their homes during the fighting that followed the end of the British mandate over the region of Palestine. Later on, it provided relief to Jewish and Palestine refugees following the 1948 conflict. In the absence of a solution to the Palestine refugee problem, the General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA's mandate, most recently extending it until 30 June 2017. UNRWA is the largest agency of the United Nations, employing over 30,000 staff.

The agency is currently facing a serious financial crisis, UNRWA is \$101 million in debt and faces a \$330 million shortfall in its \$680 million annual budget for 2015. It is not the first time it faces financial woes, but this crisis is the worst to date. There are several reasons, such as currency devaluation, the Syrian humanitarian crisis and a growth

in local needs. The number of people in Gaza relying on the agency for food aid shot up from 80,000 in 2000 to 860,000 in 2014. UNRWA gets little funding from the main UN pot so relies largely on donations from countries, nongovernmental organizations and some private donors. Historically, the United States and the European Union have provided the bulk.

INTER-CLUSTER COORDINATION AND CLUSTER SYSTEM

The UN cluster system was put in place in 2009. OCHA leads this coordination which counts the presence of most UN agencies (all the global cluster leads UNICEF, WHO, WFP, etc.) and of UNRWA who, as the largest single service provider, plays an important role in all clusters. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) remains, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the main senior humanitarian strategic policy forum. The HCT and Inter-cluster coordination group (ICCG) will develop specific action plans to respond to emerging crisis and ongoing humanitarian vulnerability. The UN organizes the donor conference based on the yearly needs assessment and proposed intervention per sector, to cover the programs of the agencies. There are also Israeli groups and NGOs that are working to advocate for a greater humanitarian space as well as to end the occupation. While the cluster leads are mandated to ensure that cluster are funded, the INGOs and local NGOs participate in the cluster implementation.

HUMANITARIAN COUNTRY TEAM (HCT)

The HCT includes actors involved at the country level in the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection, and was established in 2008. The HCT is also the policy-making forum on issues related to humanitarian access. It comprises representatives of UN agencies, representatives from the international NGO consortia Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA) and of national NGO networks. The Humanitarian Coordinator chairs the monthly HCT meeting while OCHA provides the necessary secretariat support. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies, and Médecins Sans Frontières have a status of “active” observer.

RELEVANT MINISTRIES AND GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS:

They include Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Women Affairs, Ministry of social Affairs, Ministry of Labor, Higher Council for Youth and Sports, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Palestinian Standards Institute (PSI), State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (SAACB) and others. They highly contribute to other sector sustainability.

SECURITY FORCES

Security reform was a top priority in President Abbas’s electoral agenda, and since he assumed office in 2005, security has been a pillar of his presidency. He wished to create a strictly inward-oriented security capable of enforcing stability and providing protection to the PA elite. Both objectives were only attainable through effective coordination with Israeli forces. When Abbas initiated his security reform agenda, the EU and US have backed his efforts. The victory of Hamas in the 2006-elections led to the halt of international aid to the PA and its security sector. However, when Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, donors quickly moved to support the Ramallah-based PA. The reform managed to maintain a monopoly over violence in the hands of the PA security forces. The conduct of the forces is criticized by several human rights organizations. They point at the annual report of the Independent Commission on Human Rights which registered, 3,185 complaints on human rights violations in 2012. In 2014, ICHR received 1274 complaints of alleged violations 1287 complaints in the West Bank and 996 complaints in the Gaza Strip. Integration of security forces of PA and Hamas is one of the main obstacles to intra-Palestinian reconciliation.

INTERNATIONAL DONORS

With the start of the peace process, a multi donor structure was established in 1993 to support the Palestinian state-building. The Ad Hoc Liaison

Committee (AHLC), a mechanism of 15 donors, chaired by Norway and including the US and the EU, is coordinating the development aid to the Palestinian territories. The aim of the donors was to help build the Palestinian institutions. However, they indicate that this is particularly problematic in

the light of the continued occupation and the absence of Palestinian control, except for Zone A. In 2013, Palestine received \$626 per capita of ODA, one of the highest for a country, especially if compared to DRC which received \$38.

5 ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, AND THE STRATEGIES THAT ARE BEING CONSIDERED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITIONS

5.1 ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE STRATEGIES THAT ARE BEING CONSIDERED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITIONS

5.1.1 ANALYSIS: SWOT OF THE PALESTINIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
Resilience against the Israeli occupation. Palestinian CSOs are closely in touch with the affected populations and have not only been key in providing services but also in leading the struggle for basic rights.	Often grass roots CSOs focus on their communities and do not sufficiently reach out to the donor community
Increased opportunities for participation in the national planning process.	Although modalities for NGOs participation in national planning process are in place, local community participation, especially among youth and women, in planning and policy making is still inadequate. Cooperation between PNGOs, local government and the private sector remains weak. This could be attributed to the inability of local government to provide an enabling environment for community development

CSOs have ability to capture community needs and develop successful models of addressing these needs on the ground, due to the existent linkages of the organizations and associations with local communities and grassroots organizations.	In many cases, transparency, accountability and internal governance remain weak as well as institutional capacity for monitoring and assessment.
The overall numbers of professional staff are adequate and highly qualified.	In most cases, NGOs are not accountable to beneficiaries and local communities, but rather to their own boards, donors and the PA. This lack of “horizontal” accountability can be correlated with limited beneficiary involvement at all stages of the service process.
	Services offered by NGOs are not equally accessible to the poor. Vulnerable groups (women, child, youth, disabled...) remain severely affected by inequalities in access to services and coverage.
CSOs try to be an agent for change and work on women’s rights and the empowerment of youth.	Some traditional values (heritage system, strict hierarchy) are a burden for democratization
	Strong focus on services delivery implies the risk to completely leave the policy arena, and the risk of competing with authorities in services provision
	The dependency on foreign donors implies a risk for the PNGOs to follow a ‘foreign’ agenda, rather than to the needs and demands of their constituencies
	A high number of CSOs have relatively direct political affiliation, which may impact NGAs and INGOs in maintaining their neutrality.
OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
Public services don’t cover the whole country; therefore, opportunity exists for private sector and NGOs	Donors tend to favor the larger Palestinian NGOs, due in large part to their capacity to comply with complex donor procedural requirements
Strengthen civil society, mainly grassroots .	Clients of NGOs face challenges accessing the appropriate place of care due to physical barriers (wall, checkpoints)
Committed leadership for health development	The dependency on donor funding makes Palestinian NGO vulnerable for the unpredictability and lack of transparency in the provision of donor funding
Cooperation with Israeli CSOs	The permanent condition of insecurity and emergency created by the Israeli occupation, which also generates divide within the Palestinian CSOs

<p>The need to strengthen the linkage between the CSOs and their original constituencies.</p>	<p>The proliferation of NGOs that weakens the possibility to verify the quality of actions and internal governance of the whole sector.</p>
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5.1.2 STRATEGIES THAT ARE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION TO REINFORCE THE CIVIL SOCIETY

Possible strategies to strengthen the CSOs are tackled below, in the sector analysis. Recurrent strategies are

1. Strengthening their institutional capacities and accountability
2. Strengthen their role as a development actor to promote inclusive development
3. Strengthening their role as watchdogs vs the government and improve the performance of government institutions
4. Strengthening their role in bringing concrete alternatives for current policies
5. Strengthening their networking capacities
6. Improved collaboration and/or exchange between Palestinian and Israeli CSOs to complement and learn from each others' strategies

5.2 ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, AND THE STRATEGIES THAT ARE BEING CONSIDERED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITIONS

5.2.1 ANALYSIS

The ongoing feud Fatah and Hamas has reached a peak in 2015. In July 2015, President Abbas has threatened to dismantle the 2014 unity government and has unilaterally reshuffled the cabinet. The main point of contention was the payment of the salaries of the civil servants in Gaza. Observers have criticized both parties for not being able to reconcile and cooperate in the interest of the Palestinian people. As long as this structural and polit-

ical divide paralyzes Palestinian politics, governance in both regions will not improve drastically.

In general, the various ministries are weak in the organization, regulation, and supervision of their sector, and in the coordination of policy making and planning. Although modalities for NGOs participation in national planning process are in place (e.g. workshops, consultations and meetings), they are deemed as 'superficial' by the civil society, as the decision makers hardly translate their input into policy formulation, legislation and budgeting. The weak and fragile financial position of the government undermines the ability of the ministries and units to sustain their programs.

5.2.2 STRATEGIES THAT ARE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION

Belgian NGAs have developed specific strategies according to the sector and ministry. Firstly, NGAs do advocacy towards decision makers and institutions in Belgium and the EU with regard to violations of international law and development. Concretely the NGAs are pleading for a more coherent policy towards Israel, where respect for international law is taking into regard when deepening and strengthening the bilateral relations. Several NGAs also plead for an active EU role in Palestinian reconciliation. Secondly, partner organizations of Belgian NGAs in Palestine cooperate with line ministries to improve governance and the quality of their services, especially related to health care, education, agriculture, youth and women.

5.3 ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION SECTOR AND STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN THE SECTOR

5.3.1 ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION CSOS

- Occupation-related violence and de-development have affected the quality of education. It does not meet the growing needs of a population of children and youth. The first Intifada has had a profound impact on the education system in Palestine, as the violence between 1988 and 1992 prevented students from attending school or university for large periods of time.

Education is a mirror of power structures in society. The educational system is top-down and insufficiently values the input of students. Teaching in Palestinian schools is dominated by memorizing facts rather than by stimulating critical and creative thinking.

-Meager funding limits the schools' capacities to provide adequate materials, sanitation facilities, science classes, extracurricular activities, etc.

In the formal education, there is insufficient attention for the development of personal and social skills. Hence the work of NGOs and their extra- or co-curricular activities is extremely important, for instance by resorting to culture.

- Teachers and training staff often lack the necessary qualifications, this can result in shallow teaching. They also face financial insecurity due to the financial crisis of the Palestinian Authority. Many teachers have second-jobs preparing students for the final state exam, the *tawjihi*.
- There is no uniform curriculum in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The quality of the learning materials and school books varies.
- Classrooms became increasingly overcrowded, with an average class size in government schools reaching 40 to 60 stu-

dents per class (double shifts in Gaza). Consequently the school hours are limited. Hence, there is a lot of pressure to finish the subject matter, resulting in shallow teaching.

The access to education of children in detention is problematic. Many children in detention do not receive any form of education and are not prepared to be reintegrated in school. In Area C access to education is a challenge and many children are helping out their families by working in agriculture.

The political division has an impact on the education system. After the 2008 teachers' strike in Gaza, Hamas has fired a large number of teachers and replaced them with personnel that was not always qualified.

- Access to the Higher Education system: enrolment rates are quite high, which has negative consequences on the quality. Tuition fees are on the rise and the accessibility for students with special needs is still in need of further attentions. The professional development of staff members is restricted due to the shortage of fellowship and scholarship programs to upgrade their qualifications and skills. Their low salaries have led staff members to take up extra work (cfr. increasing number of part time teachers), with a negative impact on both education (quality) and research (quality & quantity).
- Key gaps in the education system preparation of students for the labor market. Among these gaps is the pedagogy of teaching system at the secondary level which was found to be restrictive in terms of skills development. The problem, according to the study, intensifies at the tertiary level with the lack of work based learning either through weak uptake of TVET) or work-based study at the university and concludes that the education system in Palestine does not prepare the students with adequate soft and hard skills

for the labor market.

-Some CSOs exist to provide special education services to children with disabilities. However limited efforts are being made to support inclusive education and better bridging between special and mainstream education.

5.3.2 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY RELATED TO EDUCATION

- Increase donor funding for education.
- Invest more in education and extracurricular activities.
- Stimulate exchange programs in the educational and cultural domains.
- Support the advocacy of Palestinian NGOs towards the ministries and UNRWA on educational reform.
- Strengthen the HEI at various levels: capacity building for individuals, at department level, at institutional level and multi-actor capacity building

5.3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

- Level of school enrolment has improved, in the lower grades, there is almost full enrolment.
- School facilities in the Palestinian territory cannot expand due to Israeli restrictions. It is not possible to keep pace with the dramatic growth in the student population.
- Improving the teachers professional and material conditions is a priority. Some 70% of the teachers lack appropriate qualifications.
- The unity of the education system in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip needs to be preserved.
It is impossible to protect children from violence, especially in Area C, Hebron and Gaza. Providing a safe environment is a priority.

- Cultural constraints pose a challenge to equal access for girls, children with disabilities, nomadic children and children from East Jerusalem.

5.3.4 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS (INCL. UNRWA)

- Stimulate the government in its ambitious plans of an educational reform, 'from a textbook transmission/memorization model to student-centered dynamic pedagogies with the teacher as a facilitator of learning and skill development as opposed to a provider of factual knowledge.'¹
- An educational reform requires interactive teaching, where cognitive skills are promoted next to social and personal skills. Drama and playful learning techniques need to be integrated in the curriculum as they improve the learning capacities.
- UNRWA is planning an agency wide plan for education reform. It wants to find ways to stimulate children affected by violent conflict to go back to school, enabling them to learn, play and be distracted. Learning how to learn is a key goal.
- UNRWA wants to build new schools and is aiming at a school system where there is only one shift per day. Due to the financial restraints and the closure of the Gaza Strip, this will not be achieved in the near future.
- Develop a teacher professionalization policy and a teacher career path policy provide a framework to support and motivate teachers as valued professionals to deliver the highest-quality education. (UNRWA)
- Distance learning, at university and secondary school level, may be explored and developed. This is necessary.
- Educational exchanges with Palestinian communities outside the Palestinian territories

- Raise enrolment of students with a modest socioeconomic level as well as disabled persons
- Enhance quality of TVET and relevance to labor market
- Match outputs of higher education to the needs of the Palestinian society as well as local and regional market
- Enhance quality, financial accessibility and relevance of higher education
- Support the operationalization of the inclusive education policy.

5.4 ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH SECTOR AND POSSIBLE STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN THE SECTOR

5.4.1 ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY RELATED TO HEALTH

Generally speaking in Palestine and even more in the Gaza Strip, most services are provided by civil society and by UNRWA. In the West Bank, around 30% of the population depends on UNRWA for health services.

Civil society plays an important role especially for primary health care, especially in rural and remote areas. Their services are free of charge but mostly project-based, hence limited scope and duration. Most of the Palestinian health CSOs are service oriented, providing medical care. Some of them combine this with advocacy work on the access to health care, but focus less on an integrated and comprehensive approach to health, including the social determinants of health and synergy with other CSOs which are active on specific social determinants of health.

5.4.2 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY RELATED TO HEALTH

- Enhancing coordination and referral mechanisms

- Capacity building of health workers / physicians organizations
- Favoring outreach activities and direct service provision support for specific areas, i.e. Gaza and Area C
- Facilitating the re-launching of affected services by the 2014 conflict
- Target their services more explicitly towards the poor, particularly in Gaza.
- Increased participation in national planning process in order to have more influence on policy formulation, legislation and budgeting, together with advocacy for an improved regulatory environment and more equitable and inclusive pro-poor policies in health and social sector.
- Strengthen the voice of patients in their demand for better quality of care and promoting equity.
- Improve organizational development: PME skills, as well as internal management and staff development and management to become more efficient and improve their overall performance and quality.
- Explore opportunities to establish NGO partnerships, in particular with local governments, such partnerships are very important to the long-term sustainability of NGOs.
- Strengthening capacities to integrate a rights-based approach and tackle the social determinants of health through advocacy, campaigning and multi-sectoral approach and collaboration.

5.4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO HEALTH

Multiple authorities are in charge of health issues depending on the area, creating complexity in addressing institutional level. The specific situation of Gaza further limits programmatic possibilities due to counter-terrorism measures. The public health sector in Palestine suffers from an important lack of budget with denial of payment of salaries for health staff, huge debt especially creating fiscal issues.

Access to health services in Palestine face different geographical challenges according to area: in the Gaza Strip, the blockade, the closure of Rafah crossing point and consequent shortages of material supplies and impossibility to refer patients to adequate services when necessary are the main reasons for impediments in accessing health services. In the West Bank, territory fragmentation, check-points and additional regulations tend to create longer processes to access adequate services. Generally speaking, both for Gaza and the West Bank, the main challenge lies within the quality of delivered services rather than in their availability.

During the Gaza war in 2014, 87 health facilities were damaged; El-Wafa Rehabilitation Hospital, the only facility which had the capacity to treat long-term injuries and physical disabilities, was specifically targeted and destroyed. (WHO, 2015) Damaged health facilities create an additional burden to an already weakened health sector. Indeed, the Gaza Strip strongly lacks qualified health staff; there is a huge number of referrals outside the area due to lack of specialized materials, labs and staff, leading to strong access problems to quality health care (permits/authorizations/care-taker policy, etc.), not to mention supply of medical materials and drugs. Governmental public health systems and services lack monitoring to achieve quality service delivery.

Health services are usually available in the West Bank, with hospitals in main cities, and primary health care largely provided in the different areas of the West Bank. However in area C, the number of primary health care centers is limited and the process to build new ones is subject to heavy constraints, not to say nearly impossible, due to conditions imposed by Israel on local planning and development. Health professionals are generally sufficient in number, despite some gaps in specific sectors such as P&O technicians among others. However, despite their initial training, there is no continuous education system, hence the quality of health services is to be improved. Besides, lots of specialties are lacking in the governmental health

system, for instance in the mental health field with limited number of psychiatrists and counselors. Professional associations for several health staff exist.

Private health services are available and mainly used by middle and upper social classes; they are mostly located in main cities. Private sector remains inaccessible for the most vulnerable. On the other side, services are usually financially accessible when provided by UNRWA or governmental institutions.

WHO has worked in cooperation with the Ministry of Health to define package of services.

5.4.4 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO HEALTH

Considering the existence of widely disseminated services and numerous professionals, priority actions appear to lie within quality improvement:

- Training and education for health professionals, including continuous education, should be a focus area;
 - Direct support to outreach services in specific areas where services are not / less accessible to those in need / most vulnerable;
 - Increase funds allocation to the health sector and ensure possibilities to pay due salaries to all staff (lobbying institutional groups such as WB);
 - Facilitate delivery of referral approval for treatment out of Palestine.
- Support the MoH to strengthen governance, including policy, planning, monitoring and evaluation capacities, and to develop and implement a right- based health strategy. MoH needs to enhance and strengthen its efforts to engage additional national actors in health policy development and action service delivery among the various service providers is not

planned and coordinated in such a way to avoid duplication.

- Support the MoH to enhance effective health financing and rationalized expenditure
- Support the health system in strengthening the quality and efficiency of hospital services. The major quality improvement challenge is the need to introduce nationwide quality standards for licensing all health services in order to certify health personnel of all cadres to operate in health sector
- Support MoH to develop effective human resources policy and strategy, including professional training and continuous education for staff .
- Enforce accreditation of academic health programs
- Support the national system to improve the collection, quality, analysis and use of health data
- Support the MoH and other main stakeholders to develop and implement effective policies and management systems on medical products and technologies
- Support the development of systems for safe management of medical waste and hazard reduction at all levels
- Strengthen integration and coordination among all Service Providers
- Strengthen integration and coordination among the MoH, NGOs, UNRWA, and private sector service providers so that policies are streamlined and not duplicative.
- Strengthen MoH capabilities to provide oversight of roles and responsibilities of NGOs through:
 1. Establishing and developing a comprehensive health care system and assure accessibility and affordability of services
 2. Enhancing community participation and encourage community involvement by identifying resources, solutions, and advocacy for improved services.
 3. Cooperating and working in partnership according to health sector objectives and priorities, in order to: Ensure consistency

with national health policies and strategies, contribute and feed data to the national health information system

GENDER PRIORITIES

- Improve the national monitoring system, including sex-disaggregated data on health issues.
- Strengthen reproductive health services, including family planning, to improve maternal health.

Strengthen health promotion, including community-level activities, targeting healthy lifestyles and the social determinants of health, and ensuring adequate focus on women and youth.

Improve client provider interaction at maternities through capacity development and awareness raising of gender equality, gender-based violence and human rights concepts to health care.

SOCIAL PROTECTION PRIORITIES

- Strengthen an integrated, multi-sectoral and rights-based approach to social protection to respond to both social and economic vulnerabilities; to respond to vulnerability faced by women, mainstream gender into all social protection work (including conducting a gender analysis).
- Develop national monitoring and evaluation systems to strengthen evidence and ensure that social protection reaches the most vulnerable and marginalized groups; create a centralized database for all social protection initiatives.
- Enhance coordination and collaboration among stakeholders to minimize overlap and duplication, set a basic level of social protection and standardize services; strengthen the capacity of MoSA to coordinate all stakeholders, including CSOs
- Increase the capacities of ministries to develop social protection policies and regulations, and monitor and enforce compliance

- Strengthen the child protection system as cornerstone of child-friendly social welfare and ensure linkages with broader social protection system
- Identify sustainable financing for social protection and adopt a developmental approach to build the capacities of families to provide for themselves and their members, especially children
- Strengthen linkages between humanitarian and developmental assistance and incorporate humanitarian assistance as an integral part of the social protection system
- Regarding this specific issue of social protection, further analysis can also be found in the Decent Work regional CCA.

5.5 ANALYSIS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY AND STRATEGIES THAT COULD STRENGTHEN THE SECTOR

5.5.1 ANALYSIS OF GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Most Palestinian civil society organizations emerged and developed in the absence of a state, national independence, sovereignty over land and citizenship. After the creation of the Palestinian Authority, a concentration of CSOs on service delivery activities became apparent, while their engagement in the policy arena was often marked by difficulties.

CSOs manage a large variety of activities and work in all sectors, but nevertheless face an important set of issues: the series of divisions within the Palestinian civil society (see above, themes of interventions); the focus on service delivery, which implies the risk of competing with the public authorities in service provision; the permanent condition of insecurity and emergency created by the Israeli occupation, which also generates divide within the Palestinian civil society; the lack of unity

and common strategy of Palestinian civil society; the tendency of many NGOs to lose their linkages with communities and original constituencies; the tendency towards a project-based and donor-driven agenda which also leads to competition among CSOs. In East Jerusalem, Gaza and Area C, CSOs face additional challenges as described earlier on (see theme of intervention).

5.5.2 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY RELATED TO GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Empowerment of communities and strong social movements are indispensable to change power relations to the benefit of the majority of the Palestinian people. The linkage between social organizations and communities and their constituencies is crucial to start from the real needs of the people. As the Israeli occupation remains the most important obstacle for social justice and sovereign development in Palestine, it is paramount to overcome divisions and strengthen the unity in the Palestinian civil society, which tasks are double: struggling against the ongoing occupation as well as building a democratic Palestinian society in which the active participation of women, youth and PwD are promoted and valued. Despite the myriad of capacity-building programs to include those vulnerable groups, traditional role patterns still play a dominant role and make it difficult for youth and women to participate in a meaningful way within CSOs.

Strategies to strengthen civil society include:

- support the rejuvenation of CSOs;
- support a stronger cooperation between CSOs, across sectors, as well as across the borders, based on a rights-based approach;
- support CSOs' actions related to their advocacy agenda;
- empower CSO's in the field of advocacy towards their government and the EU;
- support activities aiming at bridging the gap between CSOs and their constituencies;

- support a shift from mere service provision to a stronger focus on empowerment of target groups and communities.

5.5.3 ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Although the Palestinian Authority officially affirms its engagement and support of CSOs and Palestinians in East Jerusalem, Area C and Gaza, its effective policies remain unclear and unconvincing for CSO. The PA in the West Bank often perceives critical NGOs as a threat; mainly when they are critical of the PA performance and its suppression of dissident voices.

As for Gaza, organizations have been subject to special requirements imposed by the Hamas de facto authority, which are restricting their activities for example by requesting them to obtain permits from the General Police Command for organizing public activities or events, or by pressuring for more detailed information on the organization under threat of a dissolution. (EU country roadmap for engagement with civil society)

5.5.4 5.5.4 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

In order to make government institutions more responsive to the needs of the population it is imperative that pressure from below is reinforced. Strategies include awareness raising, networking and campaigns. In order to make government institutions more democratic and representative, a more effective integration of youth, women and PwD is needed. The percentage of youth representation in the governmental institutions is very low and often their role is neglected. This imposes two strains: first, it becomes difficult to fully address the needs of the youth when they don't have a good representation in the government. Second, since they don't have a good representation in the government, it implies that youth don't have equal

chance of participation on decision-making and the implementation of policies. For more effective integration of youth, many of those governmental organizations, including municipalities and ministries, must be rejuvenated.

5.6 ANALYSIS OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND STRATEGIES THAT COULD STRENGTHEN THE SECTOR

5.6.1 ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY RELATED TO AGRICULTURE

More than 30 NGOs and CSOs are active in the agricultural sectors. A high number of them – especially the bigger one's – are recipients of donor funds, either directly or channeled through international NGOs or CSOs. Within this sector some local CSOs operating at the national level can be very large, such as e.g. Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee (PARC), the Palestinian Farmers Union or the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) who all reassemble a large number of local representative committees. The vast majority of donor funds are channeled through only four organizations: PARC, UAWC, the Land Research Centre (LRC) and the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG). Smaller and more specialized organizations or cooperatives also emerged on e.g. seeds production, organic farming or oil production as enabling actors for innovation of for creating a positive environment for the development of the sector. Academic institutions and their specialized center often play a central support role for these organizations, but also in connecting them internationally on the technical and scientific level. Others, more development oriented organization are also intervening in the sector, albeit more in the context of relief activities, specifically in the Gaza Strip.

5.6.2 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY RELATED TO AGRICULTURE

Possible strategies to strengthen the sector include:

- Strengthen role of women in agricultural sector through reinforcement of access to and control over productive assets
- Support farming cooperatives to improve marketing practices
- Build advocacy capacity of local civil society on root causes (occupation policies) and linkage with specialty, both at national and international level
- Support building of program management capacities, financial administration, effectiveness and gender inclusion for local NGOs
- Strengthen direct access to international funds for local NGOs with the aim of reinforcing financial independence
- Support farmers in participating effectively in the Monitoring and Evaluation of service delivery by the authorities
- Strengthen knowledge of labor and union rights by workers
- Develop microcredit for agricultural small and medium size enterprises
- Strengthen lines of influence between partner NGOs and community
- Promote inclusion of young and educated workforce
- Promote cultivation of longer shelf-life crops to counter farm-to-market challenges
- Develop farm to market access roads
- Urge international CSOs to build effective campaigns and work towards ending agricultural trade with Israel that finances and rewards the destruction of Palestinian farming, and promoting trade of Palestinian agriculture products
- Promote sustainable and self-sufficient agricultural practices like composting to turn organic waste into a resource for healthy soil, reducing reliance on fertilizers.
- Ensure access for the most vulnerable to free of charge agricultural services

5.6.3 ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO AGRICULTURE

The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) is responsible for most of the duties related to the management and regulation of the sector. It is also responsible for the supervision and the delivery of basic services. The budget of the MoA is financed mainly through the PA's budget, donor funding and the Humanitarian Response Strategy (HRS). Additionally to the MoA multiple ministries and public institutions play a role various levels in the agricultural sector, such as the Ministry of National Economy, the Environment Quality Authority, the Ministry of Labor, the Palestinian Water Authority or the Ministry of Local Government. On top of this, various stakeholders have been brought together in specialized agricultural boards. This multitude of decision levels, the weight of CSOs compared to governmental institutions, combined with unpredictable funding, makes the work of the governmental institutions in this sector enormously complex.

5.6.4 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO AGRICULTURE

- Support the Ministry of Agriculture in developing the capacity to establish and implement the World Trade Organization's (WTO) framework of sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS).
- Support the capacity of PA overall to collect his own revenue (tax collection) through advocacy on ending the occupation, either directly or via Palestine/Israeli NGOs or governments/international institutions.
- More detailed analysis on the appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of the services provided by the public sector
- Where possible and feasible and opportune, encourage private sector collaboration for the delivery of certain services

5.7 ANALYSIS OF RECONSTRUCTION, RELIEF AND REHABILITATION AND THE STRATEGIES THAT COULD STRENGTHEN THE SECTOR

5.7.1 ANALYSIS OF RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION CSOS

Due to long experience and extensive networks in local communities the CSOs related to RRR are capable of delivering quick and highly qualitative work. This is particularly true for Gaza organizations. High staff turnover is however a problem, as a consequence of big discrepancies in salaries between CSOs, INGOs and UN agencies, and of unpredictability of funds.

5.7.2 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY RELATED TO RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Continue to promote extensive coordination between governmental agencies, PNGOs, INGOs and relevant UN agencies, amongst other by ensuring financing for this participation and coordination roles.

Foreseeable and sufficient financing also plays a crucial role in RRR activities. Therefore, the international community must ensure the effective financing of these activities (not pledges or recycling past donations), and GoI must be held financially responsible for reconstructions.

Help increase access for Israeli CSO's to international decision making spaces

Help spread the voice of Palestinians CSO's and PNGO, and Israeli CSO's, both publicly and in international media and diplomatic and political forums.

Ensure some sort of harmonization in salaries between all actors in this sector in order to reduce high turnover at CSOs

5.7.3 ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITIES RELATED TO RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Under UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 the affected State, i.e. the government and national actors, retain the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory. Since Israel is the Occupying power in this case, these duties are of its primary responsibility. Even though there would be a recognized State to bear this duties, regarding the WB, more than 70% of the territory is inaccessible for the PA's institutions due to the zoning policy, thus limiting considerable their possible role in any RRR activity, since these area's are the most susceptible of needing RRR activities.

In Gaza, since almost no ABC building materials are allowed, effective reconstruction is impossible beyond the development of strategies on paper. Access for relief workers and material is also strictly restricted by GoI. In addition, anti-diversion policies make it impossible for implementing agencies to work with the de facto government of Gaza.

5.7.4 STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITIES RELATED TO RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

- Produce coherent disaster risk management policies across the whole of government, e.g. by including DRR in The Palestinian National Development Plan
- Strengthening the effectiveness of the national disaster management system
- Strengthen gender, age and diversity analysis and perspective in preparedness as a key element in disaster response,
- Identifying capacities for risk reduction and mitigation.

- Reduce aid dependency through greater control over own finances
 - Advocate internationally for support for National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza, despite disband of NGC
 - Support capacity of local governmental institutions through cash, fuel or equipment (Gaza)
- Adapt anti-diversion policies in order to enable cooperation of INGO with Gaza de facto authorities
 - Advocate for better predictability of funds to allow multiannual planning and budgeting

6 IDENTIFICATION OF THE RELEVANT ACTORS RELATED TO DEVELOPMENT

6.1 RELEVANT ACTORS RELATED TO EDUCATION

6.1.1 CIVIL SOCIETY

RELEVANT ACTORS RELATED TO EDUCATION		
	IMPORTANCE	RELATION WITH NGAS
NGOs	<p>-NGOs offer educational services throughout Gaza and the West Bank. They often work to support the educational efforts of UNRWA and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education.</p> <p>-Extracurricular activities are of vital importance as the school hours are limited and the budget for cultural, musical, sport activities is lacking. Cultural and social organizations provide lessons on human, social and economic rights, environment, prevention on health issues.</p> <p>-NGOs complement in-school activities by out-of-school activities on Friday and during holidays. They organize summer camps, open activities and field trips, enabling students to learn more about their country and society.</p> <p>-Most higher education institutes in Palestine are public, and were established by civil society actors. They rely on fundraising and receive partial government funding.</p> <p>-The Education Cluster structure supports the national cluster in Ramallah and its Gaza sub-cluster. Cluster membership includes the 2 co-lead agencies UNICEF and Save the Children, and local CSOs, NGOs, youth groups, INGOs and UN Agencies. They are all involved in implementing education responses in collaboration</p>	Direct

	with the MoEHE.	
Private sector & religious groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Private schools are supervised and funded by charitable associations and bodies and the private for-profit sector. -Religious groups help fund the private sector in its administration of education services. -Religious groups have influence but no direct responsibility in education other than in the religious domain. 	Direct or indirect
HEI and universities	Most universities are non-profit and rely on students' tuition fees to cover expenditure: 13 universities and 1 Open University operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In addition, there are 14 community colleges, 12 technical colleges and 1 arts and music institute.	Direct
6.1.2 RELEVANT GOVERNMENT ACTORS RELATED TO EDUCATION		
	IMPORTANCE	RELATION WITH NGAS

<p>Government</p>	<p>-The educational system is administered by the MoEHE, it includes 3 types of school from a gender perspective: boys' schools (37%) girls' schools (35%), and co-educational schools (29%). Basic education is compulsory from Grade 1 to 10, and this is divided into the preparatory stage (Grades 1 to 4) and the empowerment stage (Grades 5 to 10). During the 11th and 12th Grades (only provided by government or private schools and not by UNRWA) students select whether to go for secondary or vocational education. Finally all students are expected to leave high school after passing the tawjihi.</p> <p>-Today, multiple providers govern the education system in East Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Education Administration (JEA, a joint body of the Jerusalem municipality and the Israeli Ministry of Education), the Islamic Waqf, UNRWA and the private institutions. In the 53 Jerusalem municipal schools Israel is responsible at the administrative level, with the PA deciding issues such as curriculum, textbooks and examinations. There is little coordination and there are wide discrepancies in the quality of education offered.</p> <p>-Due to the political division there are two separate Ministries of Education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They coordinate at a technical level but without a common strategy or policy for the development of the education sector.</p>	<p>Indirect</p>
<p>UNRWA</p>	<p>-It supervises 34.4% of the schools in Gaza Strip and 5.3 percent of schools in the West Bank. The majority of UNRWA schools are located in the refugee camps.</p> <p>-Education (in Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) is UNRWA's largest program, accounting for more than half of the Agency's budget.</p> <p>-In 2010, UNRWA has started an education reform strategy. This touches on staff professional development, curriculum enrichment and development, and better provision of services for students with special needs.</p> <p>-UNRWA has been trying to reduce the student-teacher ratio in order to improve the quality of education. The number of students enrolled in UNRWA schools in Palestine has decreased from 24.6 percent to 23.1% while the number of teachers rose from 4,370 to 9,279.</p>	<p>Indirect</p>

6.2 RELEVANT ACTORS RELATED TO HEALTH

6.2.1 RELEVANT CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS RELATED TO HEALTH		
	IMPORTANCE	RELATION WITH NGAS
NGOs	<p>Provides the Palestinian population with quality comprehensive services at all levels of service delivery</p> <p>Advocacy</p> <p>Knowledge of their context</p> <p>Partnership with the local communities</p> <p>Commitment to support and develop the policies of development, legislations and national programs aiming at consolidating the rights for health</p> <p>High influence capacities related to development</p>	Direct relation with NGAS
Private universities	<p>Play a key role in the creation and distribution of knowledge Link of education programs to the needs of the labor market.</p>	Direct
Community Based Center	<p>Encourages individuals and communities to determine the course that development takes in their own towns and villages services</p> <p>Promote the rights of persons through awareness and advocacy activities</p>	Indirect
Consumer groups : patient organizations, disease support groups, PwD-organizations	<p>Representation, support, advocacy, awareness and organization</p> <p>Focus on vulnerable group (women, youth, disabled ...)</p> <p>Access to large group of people</p> <p>Participation in determining needs of all Palestinians</p>	Indirect & Direct
Media	<p>Can inform and mobilize public and consumers about their rights ...</p>	Indirect
6.2.2 RELEVANT GOVERNMENT ACTORS RELATED TO HEALTH		

	IMPORTANCE	RELATION WITH NGAS
MoH	Responsible for the health sector The MoH mandate is currently outlined and governed by the Public Health Law: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Regulating and supervising the provision of health care •Planning the health care services in coordination with different stakeholders •Enhancing health promotion to improve the health status •Development of the human resources in health sector •Management and dissemination of health information •Ensure national health expenditure being allocated according to population needs 	Indirect
Ministry of Social Affairs	Responsible for the disability sector Implement and monitor national policies MoSA develops and updates the process of providing public health insurance for the poor households on the basis of equity standards. MoSA also leads the social protection national program.	Indirect
Governorates	Mission consists in implementing the national policy and supervising all service and production activities in the provinces. The fragmentation requires decentralization of services	Direct and indirect
Public Health Institute (PHI)	PHI plays a major role in strengthening health research, data analysis and health indicators analysis, strengthening NCDs prevention and surveillance programs	x
Municipalities and village councils	Can identify local needs and target groups most in need of types of services	Indirect
Governmental research institutions	Play a key role in the creation and distribution of knowledge	x
Public Universities	Play a key role in the creation and distribution of knowledge	Indirect
Higher Council for PWDs (MoSA)	Committed to hold authorities accountable on disability	Indirect
Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development	In charge of development and infrastructures	

6.3 RELEVANT ACTORS RELATED TO GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

6.3.1 RELEVANT CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS RELATED TO GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY		
	IMPORTANCE	RELATION WITH NGAS
NGOs	Intermediary role with local actors and capacity building of its constituencies; advocacy; promotion and enhancement of participation; awareness building, watchdog of government authorities	Partners
CSOs, popular committees, grassroots groups	Intermediary between its constituencies and local authorities; promotion and enhancement of participation; organization and coordination of concrete field actions; capacity to mobilize	Partners, indirect partners and target groups
Women's organizations & groups	Intermediary between its constituencies and government/local authorities; advocacy; promotion and enhancement of participation; organization and coordination of concrete field actions; capacity to mobilize	Partners, indirect partners and target groups
Youth organizations & groups	Promotion and enhancement of participation; organization and coordination of concrete field actions; capacity to mobilize	Partners and target groups
Student organizations	Intermediary between its constituencies, target groups and government/local authorities; advocacy	Indirect partners and target groups
PWDs organizations and groups	Represent people with disabilities. Intermediary between its constituencies, target groups and government/local authorities; advocacy	Direct partners and target group
Human rights organizations	Advocacy; information collection and analysis	Indirect partners
Trade unions	Intermediary between constituencies and government; advocacy; information collection and analysis	Partners and target groups
Regional NGO networks	Intermediary between constituencies, target groups and government; advocacy	Indirect partners, target groups
Sector networks	Intermediary between constituencies, target groups and government; advocacy	Indirect partners, target groups
Media	Important channels to reach the broad public	Indirect partners and target groups

6.3.2 RELEVANT GOVERNMENT ACTORS RELATED TO GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY		
GOVERNMENT	DIRECTS THE POLICIES ON THE THEMES OF INTERVENTION	TARGET GROUP FOR INFLUENCING POLICIES.
Ministry of Education	Directs the policies on the themes of intervention	idem
Ministry of Health	Directs the policies on the themes of intervention	idem
Ministry of Labor	Directs the policies on themes related to the themes of intervention	idem
Ministry of Agriculture	Directs the policies on the themes of intervention	idem
Ministry of Local Government	Directs the policies on the themes of intervention on a local level	idem
Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs	Directs the policies on the themes of intervention in Jerusalem	idem
Ministry of Social Affairs	Directs the policies on the themes of intervention	idem
LGUs	Directs the policies on the themes of intervention on a local level	Target group for influencing policies. Indirect partner in specific activities.
Ministry of Culture		Target group for influencing policies.

6.4 RELEVANT ACTORS RELATED TO AGRICULTURE

6.4.1 RELEVANT CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS		
TYPE	IMPORTANCE	RELATION WITH NGAS
NGO's	Gradually replacing government services in some area's	Partners

Farmer Groups	Replacing government services in some area's	Partners
Local agricultural councils and CBOs	Link between local and national level	Indirect partners and target groups
Trade Unions	Intermediary with government	Indirect partners and target groups
Academic institutions	Support for CSO	Indirect partners
Agricultural cooperatives	Pooling of resources and strengthening commercialization possibilities	Direct and indirect partners
6.4.2 GOVERNMENT ACTORS		
Min of Agriculture	Development and implementation of national policies	Direct and indirect coordination
Min of National Economy	Support in implementation of national policies	Indirect coordination
Min of Local Government	Support in implementation of national policies	Indirect coordination
Min of Labor	Support in implementation of national policies	Indirect coordination

6.5 RELEVANT ACTORS RELATED TO RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

6.5.1 RELEVANT ACTORS RELATED TO RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION		
	IMPORTANCE	RELATION WITH NGAS
NGOs	Service delivery and consultation in development of national policies	Partners
INGOs	Service delivery and development of international policies	Partners, coordination

UN agencies	Main coordination bodies are in UN Cluster system	Coordination
6.5.2 RELEVANT GOVERNMENT ACTORS RELATED TO RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION		
	IMPORTANCE	RELATION WITH NGAS
Government	Develops national RRR and DRR plans	Consultation
Line ministries (e.g. Social affairs)	Improve practices in the sector	Indirect consultation
PCBS	Input for strategic development	Indirect consultation
International community	Allow impunity of GoI in HR and IHL violations	Target group for advocacy/influencing activities

7 IDENTIFICATION OF THE TYPE OF POTENTIAL PARTNERS PER NGA

7.1 GENERAL

POTENTIAL TYPES OF NGA-PARTNERS IN PALESTINE - GENERAL	
	ACTOR : CIVIL SOCIETY
NGOs	Oxfam Sol, G3W-M3M, HI, APEFE, BD, Oxfam WW, MdM, AADC, Caritas Int, SolSoc,
Human rights groups	BD, SolSoc, OxfamSol

Unions	SolSoc
Media	AADC, BD
Private HEIs & Universities	VLIR-UOS
	Actor : Government
Ministries	APEFE, VLIR-UOS, MdM-DzG, HI
LGUs	APEFE, OxfamSol, HI
Public HEIs & Universities	VLIR-UOS

7.2 PER SECTOR AND THEME

7.2.1 EDUCATION

POTENTIAL NGA-PARTNERS IN PALESTINE – EDUCATION	
	ACTOR : CIVIL SOCIETY
Local NGOs	APEFE, HI, AADC, SolSoc
Media	BD
Peace & HR groups	BD
INGOs	APEFE, HI
Private HEIs & Universities	APEFE, VLIR-UOS
	Actor : Government
Ministry of Education and Higher Education	APEFE, HI
Governorates	APEFE
Public HEIs & Universities	VLIR-UOS

7.2.2 HEALTH

POTENTIAL NGA-PARTNERS IN PALESTINE –HEALTH	
	ACTOR : CIVIL SOCIETY
Local NGOs	MdM/DzG, APEFE, HI, G3W-M3M, AADC
Coops, INGOs...	APEFE, HI
Private universities& HEIs	APEFE, VLIR-UOS
	Actor : Government
Ministry of .Health.	MdM, APEFE, HI
Ministry of Social Affairs	APEFE, HI
Governorates	APEFE

7.2.3 GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

POTENTIAL NGA-PARTNERS IN PALESTINE –GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY	
	ACTOR : CIVIL SOCIETY
NGOs	G3W-M3M, BD, SolSoc, Caritas Int, HI
Media	BD, AADC
Human Rights groups	BD, OxfamSol
	Actor : Government

7.2.4 AGRICULTURE

POTENTIAL NGA-PARTNERS IN PALESTINE –AGRICULTURE	
	ACTOR : CIVIL SOCIETY
Local NGOs	OxfamSol, Caritas Int, Oxfam WW

Coops, Associations, IN- GOs...	OxfamSol, Caritas Int, Oxfam WW
INGOs...	OxfamSol, Caritas Int
	Actor : Government
Ministry of Agriculture	OxfamSol
Ministry of Social Affairs	OxfamSol

7.2.5 RECONSTRUCTION, RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

POTENTIAL NGA-PARTNERS IN PALESTINE –RRR	
	ACTOR : CIVIL SOCIETY
Local NGOs	G3W-M3M, SolSoc, OxfamSol, Caritas Int, HI
Coops, INGOs...	OxfamSol, Caritas Int
UN Cluster System	OxfamSol
	Actor : Government
Ministry of Social Affairs	OxfamSol

8 IDENTIFICATION OF FUTURE SECTORS PER NGA, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE RELEVANT ACTORS

8.1 Future sectors and relevant actors for all sectors

SECTORS PER NGA AND THEIR RELEVANT PARTNERS		
ANGS	SECTOR	RELEVANT ACTORS
11.11.11	Coordination of NGAs.	Belgian NGAs and government actors
AADC	WASH (water, health and sanitation) and inclusive education (disabled people)	Local NGO's and INGO's, Ministries, Governorates, civil society (unions, universities, mutuality's, etc.)
APEFE	Health/ health personnel development. Social services : health - education for disabled, vulnerable groups	Local NGOs, Ministry of health, Ministry of social affairs, Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Governorates, Universities, and INGOs,
ARES-CCD	Education and research inst.	Higher Education Institutes (public/private)
BD	Human rights, Peace education	Local (Palestinian and Israeli) NGOs, INGOs, international networks, human rights organizations, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, media
Caritas	Local Governance, Local Economic Development Agriculture and diversification of rural Economy Rehabilitation (social housing, Local heritage)	MDLF, BTC, Municipalities, Village councils, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Social Affairs, Caritas Jerusalem, members of Caritas Network, CBOs, Farmers Unions.
G3W-M3M	Health, Governance & civil society	Local NGOs, international networks and NGOs, human rights organizations
HI	Education, Health, Governance & civil society, Relief & rehabilitation	Local NGOs, CSOs, rehabilitation service providers, DPOs, LGUs, INGOs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MdM	Health (Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Network, Sexual and Reproductive Health, Evaluation of Professional Practices)	Local NGOs and INGOs, local authorities/communities, Ministry of Health and decentralized authorities, public hospitals, Culture and Free Thought Association, Palestinian Counseling Center
Oxfam WW	Agricultural and economic de-	Local (Palestinian and Israeli) NGOs, representa-

	velopment	tive associations
Oxfam Sol	Agriculture, Economic and value chain development, HR and IHL, Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Aid effectiveness	Local (Palestinian and Israeli) NGOs, INGOs, representative associations, (inter)national networks, human rights organizations, Legal organizations, UN Cluster System
SolSoc	Education, health (social protection), government and civil society, reconstruction, relief & rehabilitation	Local NGOs and CSOs, universities, human rights organizations, unions, Higher Council for Youth and Sports, local authorities
UVCW - AVCB/VSGB	Agriculture, Water issues, Health, Disabled people rehabilitation, Culture, Youth, Media, Developmental Education, Sustainable Development	Municipalities, Governorates, Local NGOs, Hospitals, Schools, Cultural Associations, Farmers Unions, Media, Ministries
VLIR-UOS	Education and research in all domains	Higher Education Institutes (public/private)

8.2 STRATEGIES OF CHANGE FOR THE NGAs

8.2.1 GENERAL

KEY POINTS IN THE CONTEXT ANALYSIS:

- Palestine has the potential to develop as a middle income country, however the protracted conflict, the unstable political and economic situation and recurrent violent crisis are a major stumbling blocks on the road to development. Palestine is highly dependent on external aid to implement an ambitious state-building and institutional reform program. However, as long as the underlying political issues are not dealt with, the impact of the donor assistance remain limited. After the second Intifada, humanitarian aid took the largest share of the donor contributions, as the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure by the Is-

raeli army increased and financial assistance was needed increasingly to alleviate the needs of civilians. This shift away from development has undermined the state-building project

- The same goes for the impact of the NGA-interventions, they are aiming to improve the lives of the Palestinian people, but as the context is very risky, results are not secured. Still, NGAs ensure that their aid embedded in a rights based approach, ensuring that their contributions are not limited to ‘humanitarian relief’. They aim at reversing the de-development and achieving the basic rights of Palestinians. .
- The Palestinian government is divided, the democratic process is blocked, governance is still weak, the economy is in recession, the public services are inadequate, youth unemployment is very high, and young people face problems in raising their voice and expressing their needs.

- The polarization between the various ethnic and religious groups in Israel and the failing peace process has changed the political landscape, with a majority voting for right-wing and neo-liberal parties. Inequality is increasing, the Gini coefficient is at 39.2, which is very high compared to European countries.

WHAT WILL THE NGAs DO TO BRING CHANGE?

- Networking and influencing the political agenda with advocacy in Belgium and Europe to hold European governments accountable for their inconsistent policy towards in Israel and Palestine. They have insufficiently taking respect for IHL and HRL into account when deepening and broadening the bilateral relations, thus signaling to Israel that its violations of IHL can go unchallenged.
- Strengthening the capacities of the Palestinian CSOs in providing better services and bolster their role as watchdog of their authorities.
- Empowerment of vulnerable groups, especially youth, PwD and women, to strengthen their voice in claiming their rights and participate in the decision making process.
- Actions to support the development of Palestine should go hand in hand with increased protection against dispossession, demolitions, physical threats, particularly in those places that play a vital role in the viability of a future Palestinian state. Hence, all types of intervention, in the West Bank, should focus primarily on area C and East-Jerusalem.
- Making the Palestinian and Israeli public, in particular youth and women, aware about the impact of radicalization and promoting a conciliatory environment.

WHAT CAN CHANGE IN THE SHORT RUN?

- Improve the lives of people in terms of access to and quality of health care and education
- Create more democratic space and participation for young people, women and PwD.
- Better sharing of information and agenda with Palestinian and Israeli CSOs to enhance the

opportunities and impact of advocacy work and campaigning.

WHAT IS THE LONG TERM OBJECTIVE?

- The de-development of Palestine is reversed as the occupation is lifted. This allow the development of adequate and accessible public services and well functioning government bodies.
- The state is less dependent on foreign aid and food imports, the economy and agriculture are better developed
- The management of water, land and other natural resources in Palestine is in full control of the Palestinian government.
- The establishment of a peaceful and democratic environment where basic rights are respected

8.2.2 EDUCATION

KEY POINTS IN THE CONTEXT ANALYSIS:

- The enrolment-rate is quite high, however the sector suffers from structural challenges: unqualified teachers and inadequate infrastructure, are leading to low learning achievements and even increasing number of dropouts
- The school environment suffers from several forms of violence, the armed conflict not only result in direct attacks on school buildings and killings or injuries of students and teachers, especially in Gaza and Area C. Children on their way to school face several risks, from restrictive checkpoints to confrontations with military.
- Over the last decades, women and girls are more present at all education levels, and are currently graduating at a higher rate than male students.

WHAT WILL THE NGAs DO TO BRING CHANGE?

- NGAs invest in extracurricular activities: civic, social, economic and human rights, interreligious, ecological and cultural education. They contribute to the cognitive and social skills of pupils and empower them.

- Stimulating an active learning environment: field trips and out-of-school activities.
- Exchange programs for students and teachers.
- NGAs try to make vocational training, that is highly esteemed, more attractive.
- Capacity building for the higher education system: Individual capacity building (academics, members of civil society, government, private sector), theme-based departmental capacity building, institutional capacity building, multi-actor national-level capacity building (mix of higher education institutions).
- Capacity building of education staff on inclusive education, supporting inclusive education, support to special education schools.

WHAT CAN CHANGE IN THE SHORT RUN?

- Stronger focus on dialog and exchange in education.
Training teachers to use drama techniques, games, etc in their classes.
- MOEHE implements its educational reform rather than prioritizing the structural issues (salaries, etc).
- Better focus on vulnerable groups
- Improved individual performance of academics, improved research and/or teaching capacity (incl. services to society (outreach)), and the creation of or platform of higher education institutions to stimulate exchange and innovation.
- Improved quality of services in special education schools.

WHAT IS THE LONG TERM OBJECTIVE?

- Palestinian Education system provide equitable access to, high quality education services at all levels of the system for all Palestinians
- Education that is centered around students and that opens doors and minds.
- Through the involvement of NGAs in formal education, the promotion of social and personal skills become part of formal education.
- Improving teaching materials, uniform curriculum.
- Abolishing the double shifts, evolving to one shift per school.

- Universal access, sufficient classrooms.
- Contribute to a number of national development challenges through innovation, better HR, development of local technology, multiplier effects, entrepreneurship, etc.
- Improved inclusiveness of education services

8.2.3 HEALTH

KEY POINTS IN THE CONTEXT ANALYSIS:

- Not sufficient number of structure within each area of Palestine leading to necessary movements out of the territories or from one territory to another, leading to heavy process of authorization by the Israeli authorities
- Lack of access to services linked to heavy procedures for referral out of Palestine as well as entry of medical supply especially within Gaza Strip
- Difficulties for companion to visit the patients out of Palestine and additional delays for authorization clearance for companion (necessary for children under 17)
- Difficulties for health staff to access their place of work due to permit authorizations
-Fragmentation of the territories with different status leading to difficulties to ensure one proper health policy within Palestine. Lack of communication and common policies between Ramallah MoH, and Gaza MoH.
- Lengthy and difficult process for medical items to enter Palestine especially Gaza
-Mental health issues are extremely prevalent due to the socio-economic context as well as recurrent conflicts, leading to a strong need of adequate treatment and follow-up, currently not properly in place in Palestine
-Problem of basic supplies such as water, electricity and fuel
- Lack of expertise by the Health staff especially in Mental Health
- Lack of integrated and comprehensive approach to health, including the social determinants of health and synergy between health actors and other CSOs which are active on specific social determinants of health.

- Access to quality rehabilitation services for PwD and injuries

WHAT WILL THE NGAs DO TO BRING CHANGE?

- Service deliveries also provided by NGA and need to advocate for facilitating access to services especially referrals and access to medical treatment especially but not only for chronic diseases.
- Capacity building of health workers
- Enhance coordination among local stakeholders
- Exchanges of knowledge and skills through various actors
- Link local actors to international networks
- Implementation through multilateral partner organizations, with two or three parties (triangular cooperation)
- National implementation through a local partner rather than a directed implementation or through co-management
- Capacity-building on the social determinants of health

WHAT CAN CHANGE IN THE SHORT RUN?

- Strengthened capacities of regional and local organizations to provide medical/rehabilitation/ health services for all Palestinians
- Better trained health professionals
- Health care quality improvement and institutionalization
- Better partnership, networking and coordination between sectoral stakeholders
- Better focus on vulnerable groups
- Improved policies on the right to health and the social determinants of health
- More cooperation between the health actors and other CSO which are active on specific social determinants of health
- Ensuring qualitative rehabilitation services for people in need currently excluded (war victims due lack of services, people in area C due to movement constraints) as well as reconstruction of damaged or destroyed health facilities
- Building capacities for health staff in emergency preparedness in the Gaza Strip

WHAT IS THE LONG TERM OBJECTIVE?

- Working with the MoH to ensure quality service delivery, revision of training curricula for health staff
- International advocacy calling for easing procedures for movements of patients, health staff and medical supplies, and for reconstruction material in the Gaza Strip
- Access to appropriate health care services for Palestinian citizens regardless their gender, age, disability, socioeconomic status
- Palestinian Health Care system provide access to equitable, affordable, high quality health services for all Palestinians
- Palestinian Health Care system enhanced its performance and is adapted to the current main priorities: Non Communicable Diseases, healthy lifestyles, mental health, continuum of care, vulnerable group health

8.2.4 GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

KEY POINTS IN THE CONTEXT ANALYSIS:

- Palestinian civil society is currently characterized by many divisions and a lack of unity.
- Lack of common strategy within Palestinian CSOs
- Tendency towards competition on service provision between CSOs and government institutions
- Dependency on external aid and donor-driven projects which focus on service provision
- Tendency of many NGOs to lose links with basic constituencies.
- Specific situation of CSOs in East Jerusalem, Gaza and Area C

WHAT WILL THE NGAs DO TO BRING CHANGE?

- Strengthening of local CSOs and link them with each other and international networks with expertise on governance.

- Strengthen NGOs and CSOs to increase their advocacy efforts towards the EU level.
- Establish campaigns and advocacy to promote good governance, set up a direct dialog with government bodies

WHAT CAN CHANGE IN THE SHORT RUN?

- A stronger, better organized local civil society
- A gradual rejuvenation of CSOs
- More exchange between CSOs across the several divisions
- Increased adoption of a rights-based approach by CSOs capable of influencing national and international policy makers

WHAT IS THE LONG TERM OBJECTIVE?

- A more unified Palestinian civil society
- Change (international) policies through a common rights-based agenda of CSOs to the benefit of the majority of the Palestinians and sovereign development
- An increasing ability to influence change at the EU and member state level, reversing the influence of strong pro-Israel voices.

8.2.5 AGRICULTURE

KEY POINTS IN THE CONTEXT ANALYSIS:

- Agricultural production is declining resulting in dependence on food aid and imports
-The major constraint affecting the Agricultural sector is the Israeli occupation, control and influence. Whether it is access to the land, clean water, water technology, energy, agricultural inputs, infrastructure, and most importantly the markets, all are under the direct control or influence of the Government of Israel.
- Settlements restrict the availability of limited natural resources such as land and water to the 2.4 million Palestinians living in the West Bank. Settlements consume 75 percent of the water in the West Bank, much of which is used to produce agricultural items for export. In times of drought settlers are given priority of access to water over Palestinians.

- The dumping of wastewater from settlements into Palestinian agricultural lands in the West Bank also endangers long-term viability and production of the agricultural sector.
- OCHA has estimated that additional transportation costs incurred by transporting Palestinian farm produce via routes that avoid the most problematic Israeli checkpoints amount to \$1.9m annually. As well as increased transport costs, Palestinian farmers have to pay for water that is brought in by tankers, making their produce much more expensive and therefore less competitive than that of Israeli settler farmers.

WHAT WILL THE ANG'S DO TO BRING CHANGE?

- Ensure that every type of agricultural development will address both the shorter term improvement of the economic situation of Palestinian farmers and herders and fishermen, and the root causes of the de-development of Palestine: the occupation.
- Highlight the importance and support the view of agriculture as a way to support resilience of Palestinians to stay on their land.

WHAT CAN CHANGE IN THE SHORT RUN?

- An international coalition – together with Belgian NGAs – should induce an increased international pressure on the Government of Israel regarding IHL and HRL violations. This could lead to an increased isolation of the country on the international scene, therefore forcing a change in practice by the GoI.
- Increased pressure from Israeli progressive groups inside and outside Israel could force political change in the country, even though activities of groups identified as left-wing are increasingly criminalized (anti-NGO law, anti-BDS law, etc.)

WHAT IS THE LONG TERM OBJECTIVE?

- Increased academic, diplomatic and public pressure combined with economic pressure as a consequence of declining economic ex-

changes with Europe will force the government of Israel to radically change their policies in order to avoid being a pariah-state and genuinely seek a negotiated peace with the Palestinians that will allow a viable and prosperous State of Palestine to emerge. This will allow the Palestinian agricultural sector to develop and play again its role as a source of food and income for the most vulnerable communities.

- The long-term objective is a society where men and women are food secure, have a shared sovereignty over their resources and enjoy social justice.

8.2.6 RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

KEY POINTS IN THE CONTEXT ANALYSIS:

- One of the key limitations for Reconstruction, Relief and Rehabilitation is a lack of access. Indeed, Israel controls all entries into Palestine, except for Rafah Crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Increasingly Israel requires NGO workers to obtain a work visa at Israeli embassies before entering Palestine.
- During recent years, the situation for humanitarian actors in West Bank has somehow improved, however, during periods of conflict, this is likely to become challenging. A multitude of internal checkpoints is making movement for humanitarian personnel difficult. During conflicts, aid organizations are confronted with increased difficulty moving around the West Bank. Regarding the Gaza Strip, movement for humanitarian personnel remains irregular and unpredictable.
- Another key limitation is the availability of funding, for both INGOs and PNGOs, as well as for UNRWA and other UN agencies. The proliferation of conflicts and humanitarian crisis has impacted the funding available. UNRWA is currently facing what could prove to be an existential financial crisis. This could have devastating consequences for Palestinian refugees who rely on UNRWA for basic services like

health and education. UNRWA is also a major employer of Palestinian refugees.

- The effectiveness of the aid projects and programs that are being implemented actually can also be questioned. This is a result of the specific Palestinian context (e.g. fragmentation leads to higher costs, double taxation of goods) and the absence of a political solution. Donors are funding structures that could be demolished, this contributes to this uncomfortable status quo, resulting from the near total impunity for rights violations enjoyed by the Gol.

WHAT WILL THE ANGs DO TO BRING CHANGE?

- Implement capacity building for and supporting evidence based advocacy by INGOs & partners (both Palestinian and Israeli) towards key duty bearers.
 - Strengthening of local CSOs and their networks to be more effective in humanitarian response.
- Capacity building of women's right organizations and coalitions to strengthen the quality of women's engagement and contributions to the local & national level political decision making process
- Capacity building of PwDs' right organizations and coalitions to strengthen the inclusiveness of humanitarian response and their involvement in the local & national level political decision making process
 - Israeli and Palestinian CSOs have enhanced capacity to provide support and respond to individual and/or collective cases of human rights and international humanitarian rights violations of Palestinian civilians.

ABOVE STRATEGIES WILL BE PURSUED THROUGH:

- Integration of strong policy influencing component into humanitarian work and conflict transformation work with a clear role for INGOs and partners.
- Visible integration of Do no Harm approach in all programs and projects.

- Use consistently MEAL systems at institutional and program and project level with baseline and endline data for decision making, with particular focus on policy influencing components.
- Increased capacity of INGOs, PNGOs and partners to integrate gender in emergencies minimum standards.
- Support capacity building of partners based on partners' needs and prioritized
- Increased capacity of INGOs, PNGOs and partners to provide inclusive response in emergencies in line with humanitarian standards.

WHAT CAN CHANGE IN THE SHORT RUN?

- Palestinian authorities and actors have resources and capacity to respond effectively to humanitarian needs.
- The humanitarian community is putting in place appropriate gender and conflict sensitive response.
- Effective and concrete political and economic measures are applied and lead to concrete repercussions for Israel.
- The active participation of men and women and increased decision making role of women in humanitarian, peace building and national reconciliation processes in line with women, peace and security resolutions is ensured.
- Improved active participation of PwDs in humanitarian response leading to a more inclu-

sive of all response by the humanitarian community

- Clear, participatory and shared strategies enabling a better engagement between PA and CSOs related to Area C, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.

WHAT IS THE LONG TERM OBJECTIVE?

Globally, more Palestinian men and women live a life free of violence and with dignity. This translates in the following more specific objectives:

- More Palestinian men and women receive appropriate and timely humanitarian assistance (taking into account specific and different needs) that contributes to longer-term resilience.
- Israel is increasingly held accountable for violations of IHL (including application of UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, or UNSCR1325).
-Palestinians are more protected, have more access to and more control over their land, resources and movement.

9 ANALYSIS OF THE RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES PER SECTOR

Taking into account the very unique situation in the region, interventions in all sectors are somehow risky. General risks are: the ongoing violence and instability, donor dependence and fatigue and the fragile financial position of the PA, the Palestine political division, movement restrictions, the extreme difficult situation to work in Gaza,

9.1 SECTOR EDUCATION

EDUCATION	
OPPORTUNITIES	RISKS
Exchange programs in higher education, Erasmus mundus.	Violations of the right to education.
Institutions such as VLIR that are drivers for change.	Traditional vision on education prevents educational reform.
Cooperation between local and international NGAs in cultural domain.	Cutbacks in donor support to UNRWA.
Inclusive education policy	Resistance to change

9.2 SECTOR HEALTH

HEALTH	
OPPORTUNITIES	RISKS
Existing service in place, leading to possibility to work on user center and right based approaches, hence quality of services	Recurrent conflict affecting health structure, full population, increasing medical needs and creating new medical needs.
Presence of international actors and civil society in health sector	Lack of access to services for persons with disabilities
Existing qualified staff for primary health care and general practitioners	Risk that civil society keeps substituting governmental services.
UNRWA system in place	Lack of appropriate mental health structures and professionals in a context leading to high potential psychological disorder

The active role of civil society organizations and academia;	Increasing poverty and unemployment rates. Weak coordination and communication with other providers and sectors.
National Health Strategy identifies clear priorities and need for governance	-Resistance to change.

9.3 SECTOR GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY

GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY	
OPPORTUNITIES	RISKS
Potential of youth, PwD and women	Israeli repression of Palestinian CSOs, especially in East Jerusalem
Network and support of international CSOs	Dependency on external aid leading to donor-driven agendas of CSOs (service provision vs rights-based approach and empowerment strategy)
CSOs receptive for a rights-based approach	Unclear commitment of PA regarding East Jerusalem
	Fragmentation of Palestinian civil society

9.4 SECTOR AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURE	
OPPORTUNITIES	RISKS
Potential of very good agricultural resources (land)	Access to these resources (buffer zone in Gaza, Area C and seam zones in WB) stays restricted by Gol. Negative agricultural practices remain (burning of solid waste, dumping of liquid waste on agricultural land, also by settlers)

Presence of agricultural resources (water)	Water distribution between Palestinian and settlers in WB continues to be distorted (25%-75%). Water quality does not improve in Gaza, making safe water completely unavailable as soon as 2020.
Extensive local expertise	Shrinking agricultural activities due to inability to develop sector (and the increase of imports – through aid or not) might lead to loss of local capabilities
Foreseeable funding allows implementation of long term planning	Funding of the MoA (via PA) is not withheld by GoI as a means of retaliation against a political move

9.5 SECTOR RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF AND REHABILITATION	
OPPORTUNITIES	RISKS
Increased access (non security related)	Externally imposed access restriction (not related to real security issues) could increase and affect ability to obtain work permits for internationals, East Jerusalem permits for West Bank staff and restrictions on movement to the West Bank. The current and possible future restrictions may impact on the quality of programs and of due diligence processes.
Security situation remains stable, in the Gaza Strip and/or West Bank	Risk of escalation/flare up of violence in the Gaza Strip, and a potential escalation of violence in the West Bank. This could eventually lead to impossibility of the projects due to inability to access project sites.
Palestine will remain high on donor agenda	As a result of ongoing and protracted crises in the region (e.g. Syria, Yemen), there is a risk that Palestine will be de-prioritized by instructional donors, resulting in reduction of funds available for OPT

<p>Sufficient reconstruction material is allowed to enter Gaza</p>	<p>The GRM is used by Gol as yet another bureaucratic scheme to control movement and access making humanitarian assistance difficult and expensive, and entrance of ABC's stays very limited</p>
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10 ANALYSIS OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AND ADDED VALUE FOR SYNERGY AND COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN NGAS, AND WITH THE BELGIAN BILATERAL PROGRAM AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

10.1 INTRO: OPPORTUNITIES OF SYNERGY AND COMPLEMENTARITY

CURRENT STATUS

Given the context, very few Belgian NGAs have a local representation in Palestine. Most NGAs regularly meet at the Middle East platform which coordinates lobby and advocacy work in Belgium and at European level. It does not deal with programs and projects in Palestine, however the platform does offer the possibility to ex-change about the program work, hence most NGAs are familiar with each other's programs.

The common understanding of the members of the Middle East Forum is that joint advocacy and campaigning are key to achieve change in both Palestine and Israel. The Belgian NGAs are demanding accountability and a more coherent policy from the Belgian government and the EU. The Middle East Platform produces op-eds and policy papers focusing on the violations of IHL and HRL and recommends measures such as the correct application of EU legislation with regard to settlement prod-

ucts, lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip and claiming compensation for the destruction of EU-funded projects by Israel. and compensation for the destruction of EU-funded projects by Israel. It also issues policy briefings and organizes visits with MPs to the region. In the future, the platform aims to focus on such issues as aid coherence, and how the aid to Palestine needs to be linked with the bilateral relations with Israel and economic relations between Belgium and Israeli settlements. To obtain this, the NGAs will improve sharing of information and cooperation. In this line, 11.11.11 will hire a halftime coordinator in support of the Middle East Platform.

The Belgian NGAs have a specific and well developed focus in their programs, and most of them are working in complementarity. The CCA-process has made clear that there is no overlap in terms of the specific interventions, even if some NGAs in the health/education sector are working with the same partners. There is a good division in sectors and themes that are covered: Oxfam covers humanitarian interventions and agriculture, AADC aims to work in the water sector, BD works with Human Rights groups in both Palestine and Israel, HI SolSoc and G3W-M3M have projects with youth, but in different areas and with different types of groups, UVCW and AVCB/VSGB coordinate the twinning projects, VLIR-UOS works with the HEIs, some Decent Work NGAs are supporting trade unions, HI, APEFE and the Province of Hainaut are addressing some of the high needs in the education and health sector, including rehabilitation for people with disabilities and injuries, CNCD collaborates with one of the NGO platforms, HI also covers humanitarian response and reconstruction, etc

Currently, there are no synergy projects among Belgian NGAs in Palestine, though in the past Oxfam Sol and SolSoc did, in the past, develop and implement common humanitarian strategies in land rehabilitation and reclamation in cooperation with their respective partners in Gaza and the West Bank. Caritas recently started a synergy project within the LGRDP-program, another NGA tried to set up a synergy project with BTC, but it failed

due to the specific context and substantial differences in terms of mandate and agenda. Nonetheless, it's important that the NGAs keep each other informed and keep being keen on possible synergies and exchange about transversal themes to strengthen each other's' programs and results in the region. The Belgian Forum, organized by the Belgian Consulate in East-Jerusalem has recently been re-activated and could create new opportunities for synergy in the future.

LIST OF POTENTIAL SYNERGIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES

A. LEVEL OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

- At this moment, the sharing mainly happens at informal meetings, or at meetings of the Middle East platform.
- Both NGA's and the Belgian government actors (DGD, BTC, Belgian Consulate in East-Jerusalem) are in favor of a more institutionalized consultation to update each other, and identify and possibly explore synergies. If relevant, the consultations can also be split up per sector (eg. education) or thematic (eg. youth) working groups.
- One working group could cluster all Belgian actors on 'inclusive education' as a first step to further optimize complementarity and discuss operational collaboration (see below). In view of the specific needs and humanitarian situation of the Gaza Strip, a group could also be set up in order to further enhance the impact of Belgian cooperation in the region.
- Broederlijk Delen can share information about the situation of Human Rights Defenders in Palestine and Israel and the opportunities for common advocacy efforts in Belgium and the EU.
- The creation of a Belgian Local Authorities Network for Palestine can exchange information in the aim of a better coordination of the action of the municipalities on the field. UVCW/AVCB - VSBG is currently mapping all the municipalities involved.

- VLIR-UOS can share information about scholarship opportunities.
- In order to improve the development relevance of university cooperation, VLIR-UOS can involve Belgian and local CSOs in the development of a country strategy and in the development of project calls, etc.

B. OPERATIONAL LEVEL

- Inclusive education: AADC, HI, APEFE and the Province of Hainaut are promoting a better integrated sector approach for inclusive education. They aim to improve coordination in capacity building of the stakeholders linked to the education sector and optimize their geographical complementarity and facilitating direct links with other sectors, such as health and economic development. In case they succeed, resources (equipment, experts...) could be shared and or pooled, and joint training, advocacy and lobby activities can be pursued. There are also possibilities to broaden the current level of exchange between Belgian and Palestine experts, in collaboration with o.a. Wallonie Bruxelles International
- Water and agriculture: the Municipality of Ixelles, active in Zababdeh for several years is promoting access to water. Since AADC is expert in this specific sector but in other regions (West and Central Africa), experiences and good practices could be exchanged in order to manage common activities or projects on this specific issue.
- Health and rehabilitation care: AADC, HI, APEFE and the Province of Hainaut could explore a similar process as mentioned above, with the aim to improve coherence and efficiency in the sector.
- Scholarships provide an opportunity to explore synergy, both for internships as for MSc. thesis field work of both local and Belgian students.
- Broederlijk Delen will promote common work by Palestinian and Israeli partners on respect for international law, via advocacy in Belgium, the EU and Israel; advocacy tours and awareness building in Belgium.

- VLIR-UOS aims to support HEIs in Palestine. These universities will be supported in the areas of education (capacity development) , research (generate innovation) and extension (partner universities), which have links with other NGAs.
- G3W-M3M and PHM aim to reinforce the Palestinian section of PHM (People’s Health Movement) in order to enhance more collaboration between local (health) CSOs and strengthen advocacy and movement building.
- SolSoc is planning to work in close partnership with specific Belgian union bodies to develop common strategies regarding youth and workers in Palestine by further deepening their cooperation with broad sectors of society such as university and college students, youth clubs and associations, popular committees, the unemployed and Palestinian union bodies and committees.
- At this moment, the Palestinian media are often left outside the scope of the Belgian NGAs. However, the media have a potential to promote and to disseminate our common agenda with the local partners, in the field of advocating a rights based approach related to human rights, education, health, social protection, etc,.. The Province of Hainaut has developed a partnership with Ma’an, which could help in providing media capacity building for local partners.

C. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

- Oxfam Sol and Oxfam WW have integrated their program with 4 other Oxfam members and is developing its own expertise within this consortium. It is also a member of the AIDA platform, takes the lead of some UN Sector Clusters within the humanitarian aid coordination, while participating in others.
- As of 2015, G3W-M3M, Solidagro and KIYO established a consortium to integrate the right to health, right to food and Child rights in their programs.
- As of March 2014, HI started a collaboration with UNRWA, with a dedicated staff special-

ized in disability seconded in the UNRWA office in order to advocate and raise consciousness of UNRWA staff on the rights of PwD and advance the Agency’s work to equitably serve refugees with disabilities using a twin track approach. In 2015, HI has additionally been collaborating with UNMAS on risk assessment work to fast-track the rubble removal process in Gaza. HI is also member of AIDA, it is a leading member of the International Disability Group (IDG), and is actively involved in several UN system clusters (protection, health, education, shelter) and working groups (psychosocial, child protection, mine action...).

- Each authority part of the “Belgian Local Authorities Network for Palestine” has always started their partnership with Palestine at an institutional level (Municipality to Municipality, Province to Governorate) through twinning or cooperation agreement. Belgian and Palestinian local authorities choose the sectors of intervention together according to the needs of the population. The projects are lead by the local authority itself but run by a various range of partners (NGO’s, CSOs, etc.). For instance, the municipality of Ixelles, working with Zababdeh, improves the technical capacity of the local municipality with regards to agriculture, water issues and governance.

CONCLUSION

The internal discussion on synergy and complementarities were buzzing, and started from two key positions: 1) The needs and demands of our local partners, and 2) the institutional strategic choices of the Belgian NGAs. The wide variety of synergy and complementarity has a direct connection with the divergent areas of strategies and operations. We can conclude that there is a fairly large complementarity between them. Hence, the list of potential synergies show that willingness to work together is certainly present. The decision of 11.11.11 to hire a part-time Middle East Policy Officer can certainly make the Middle East platform more affective and enhance the cooperation

between the NGAs and their partners, and possibly provide new avenues for increasing the pressure on policymakers, both in Palestine and in Belgium and Europe. As a final conclusion of this CCA, we want to stress that all aid to Palestine will remain fragile as long as the roots of the conflict are not addressed. Therefore, the NGAs commit to invest their energy in joint political work and campaigns in order to demand a more coherent Belgian and European policy in the region, based on respect for international law.

ANNEX 1 : LIST OF ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

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ANNEX 2 : LIST OF LOCAL INVOLVED ACTORS

This document is the result of the interaction between the Belgian NGAs and their partners. We have listed the partners per sector:

FOR HEALTH & REHABILITATION (APEFE, AADC, HI, M3M, OXFAM SOL, MDM)

- BASR: Bethlehem Arab Society for Rehabilitation
- GUDP: General Union of persons with Disabilities
- HWC & UHWC : (Union of) Health Work Committees
- PMRS: Palestinian Medical Relief Society

FOR (INCLUSIVE) EDUCATION (APEFE, HI, VLIR-UOS, AADC, SOLSOC)

- Theatre Day Productions
- Palestinian Circus School
- Right to Education Campaign Bir Zeit
- Qattan Foundation
- Arab Educational Institute
- Tamer Institute
- Defense for Children International Palestine
- Popular Art Center,
- BASR: Bethlehem Arab Society for Rehabilitation
- GUDP: General Union of persons with Disabilities

FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE & HUMAN RIGHTS (OXFAMSOL, M3M, SOLSOC, CNCD, CARITAS, UVWC/AVCB)

- MA'AN Development Center,
- Bisan Center for Research and Development
- Gisha: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement

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- BTS: Breaking the Silence
 - Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel
 - WCLAC: Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling

FOR AGRICULTURE (OXFAM SOL & WW, CARITAS, AADC, UVWC/AVCB)

- PHG: Palestinian Hydrology Group
- PLDC: Palestinian Livestock Development Center
- UAWC: Union of Agricultural Work Committees